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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the effects of the elimination of a payroll tax on employ-
ment and wages in four manufacturing and service sectors in Brazil in early 
2012. This tax, which accounted for 20 percent of the wage bill, was levied on 
employers and financed social security programmes. This study is based on 
administrative records from the Brazilian Ministry of Labour which contained 
information on formal employment contracts. Exploring the fact that the tax 
reform only covered firms not under a special tax regime for micro and small 
firms, a difference-in-differences approach with firm fixed effects was imple-
mented to compare covered and uncovered firms controlling for sector, region 
and other covariates. The estimates suggest that, on average, the policy led to a 
15 percent increase in employment, total labour input measured by contracted 
hours of work rose by 9 percent, and wages increased by 2 percent. These re-
sults indicate that in its first year of implementation the policy had positive 
employment effects and a partial shifting of the tax benefit onto labour. 
Keywords 
Payroll tax, labour demand, employment, wages, Brazil, social security. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
This research paper evaluates the effects of a payroll tax reduction on em-
ployment and wages in Brazil. The policy, announced in 2011, aimed to en-
hance the competitiveness of Brazilian companies, to stimulate employment, 
and to promote the formalization of employment (Ministério da Fazenda 2012: 
6). It was expected that by reducing the cost of labour, firms would increase 
their demand for labour and be less inclined to set informal work arrange-
ments. 
The policy initially covered four industries – parts of the textile industry, 
the garment industry, leather and shoe industries, and information and com-
munication technology industries – and was later extended to include addition-
al manufacturing and service sectors. Currently, 56 sectors are covered includ-
ing almost the entire manufacturing industry, services and retail commerce.       
Following an international trend, in Brazil taxation on labour has been a 
central pillar in the financing of the public social security system since the 
1930s (Hart 1984: 55, Pochmann and Santos 1998: 4). These programmes in-
clude pension funds for retirement and survivors, unemployment benefits, 
workplace injury insurance and other benefits that create safety nets for the 
working classes.  
Simultaneously, the effects of payroll taxes on the labour market and on 
the economy as whole have received attention from economists. Discussions 
are set around the importance of social security to the behaviour of agents in 
the labour market, as well as on whether and how payroll taxes affect the level 
of wages and employment.  
A number of empirical studies have tested the predictions generated by 
theoretical frameworks but have not achieved entirely clear and generalized 
conclusions. It seems that specific circumstances relating to labour markets, 
more structured and homogeneous in developed countries, or more heteroge-
neous and less formalized markets in developing economies, play a key role in 
determining the final outcome. Studies about experiences in developing coun-
tries in particular may help to design policies compatible with such heteroge-
neous and less formal labour markets. 
The reform of labour taxation in Brazil is an opportunity for the study of a 
natural experiment in a developing economy. The levels of unemployment and 
informality, the composition of the manufacturing sector, and institutional as-
pects of the Brazilian economy are similar to those in other developing coun-
tries, especially in Latin America. This study, thus, aims to contribute to the 
understanding of the implications of labour tax policies for the country and the 
region. 
The research paper will investigate if and to what extent the reduction of 
the payroll tax implemented in Brazil in 2012 affected the employment level, 
labour input, and wages in four economic sectors covered by the policy. This 
study will also seek to answer the question whether there were differences in 
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these effects for administrative/managerial employees and production workers, 
and between the primary and secondary workforce (women, young workers). 
There are some limitations to this study. First, its scope is limited to the 
effects on the labour market, not addressing the fiscal implications of the re-
form. Second, possible effects of labour taxation on the formalization of jobs 
cannot be measured due to a lack of information about informal work at the 
level of the firm. Third, the natural delay of statistics in relation to social facts 
prevents the study of effects after 2012, the first year of the policy adoption. 
Fourth, the study only evaluates the impacts on the few sectors covered initial-
ly by the policy.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, the study takes advantage of a labour 
tax reform which had two notable components. One, the change affected la-
bour costs substantially and had the potential to influence decisions regarding 
employment and wages. Two, the reform did not affect all firms, thus generat-
ing potentially credible counterfactuals that allow for the identification of caus-
al relationships. These features provide an opportunity to examine the relation-
ships between payroll tax and employment and wages at the level of the firm.  
So far, studies about the effect of the payroll tax reduction on the Brazili-
an labour market have not been conclusive and have produced different results 
(FGV Projetos 2013, Dallava 2014). This study intends to contribute to the 
discussion by adopting an approach that differs from these previous works. 
Using panel data from the Brazilian Ministry of Labour, the study adopts a dif-
ference-in-differences approach to examine whether firms covered by the poli-
cy perform differently as compared to similar firms that are not exposed to it.   
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 will present the labour tax reform, 
contextualizing the policy both historically and in relation to the economic cir-
cumstances of its adoption. Chapter 3 summarizes the controversy around the 
magnitude and the effects of the so called ‘social charges’ on the payroll bill in 
Brazil in the last decades. Chapter 4 is dedicated to theoretical frameworks that 
put forward explanations for the relationships between payroll taxes and labour 
market outcomes. Empirical studies are presented and their methodological 
approaches are discussed in Chapter 5. After that, chapters 6 to 8 present the 
core of the empirical analysis, including the empirical strategy (Chapter 6), the 
data (Chapter 7), and the results (Chapter 8). Finally, Chapter 9 presents the 
conclusions. 
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Chapter 2  
Research Problem 
In August 2011, the Brazilian government announced a comprehensive plan to 
stimulate external competitiveness, to raise investments, and to favour tech-
nical progress – the ‘Plano Brasil Maior’ (MDIC 2012). One of its main com-
ponents was a change in the payroll tax applicable to four economic sectors: 
garments, leather and shoe industries, segments of the textile industry, and IT 
and ICT services sectors, including call centres. The payroll tax reform was 
embodied in federal law n. 12.546, of 14/12/2011 (Government of Brazil 
2011), and further legislation1. 
2.1 Characteristics and coverage 
The payroll tax reform consisted of a substitution of the mandatory employers’ 
contribution (CPP) to the General Regime of Pension Fund (RGPS) by a tax 
on gross revenues excluding export revenues. The RGPS assures workers em-
ployed by the private sector, of retirement and survivors’ pensions, including 
temporary or permanent disability, sickness, pregnancy, arrest, death and aging. 
To be eligible, workers have to be registered and employers must contribute 
monthly. 
Contributions to social security in Brazil come from both the employee 
and the employer. The employee contributes 8, 9 or 11 percent of his/her 
wage, up to a monthly taxable base limited to BR$ 4.390,24 in 2014. The em-
ployers’ contribution, the CPP, is set at 20 percent of the payroll bill without 
any limit. 
The reform reduced the CPP to zero and substituted it with a tax on gross 
revenues excluding exports which was initially set at 1.5 percent for manufac-
turing industries and 2.5 percent for service sectors. In August 2012 these tax 
rates were reduced respectively to 1 percent for manufactured goods and 2 
percent for service sectors (Government of Brazil 2012). This measure started 
in January 2012 with an initial validity until December 2014. More recently, the 
Government enacted legislation to make the reform permanent (Government 
of Brazil 2014).  
The labour tax reform was designed to be applicable to firms that produce 
a list of manufactured products and to firms registered as operating in specific 
service sectors (Government of Brazil 2011: see articles 7th and 8th). In the 
case of the service sector, the reform affects the entire firm if it is officially 
classified as operating in one of the sectors included. However, for manufac-
turing firms, coverage may be partial. If, for instance, a manufacturing firm has 
only 50 percent of its products included in the list, then the changes in the pay-
roll tax is cut in 50 percent and the revenue tax is levied on 50 percent of its 
revenues.  
                                                 
1 A summary of the relevant legislation is found in Zanghelini (2013: 30-34). 
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The policy did not apply to firms which were operating under the National 
Simplified Tax Regime for Micro and Small Enterprises (Simples Nacional) as 
their payrolls were already exempted from the CPP. The Simples offers firms a 
simplified system of tax collection, reduces paperwork, and lower the tax bur-
den. Opting firms can pay eight different taxes2 including the CPP by a single 
levy on their revenues ranging from 4.5 percent to 12.11 percent for the manu-
facturing industries and from 4.5 percent to 16.88 percent for the service sec-
tors depending on their revenues. Firms with annual revenues up to R$ 3.6 
million in 2012 were eligible to apply for this special regime. Therefore, the 
payroll tax reform affected mostly larger firms or those small and medium 
firms that could not or had not opted for the simplified Simples regime. 
2.2 Objectives of the payroll tax reform 
By reducing total labour costs, the tax reform aimed at increasing the external 
competitiveness of tradable goods, stimulating employment, and promoting 
formalization of employment contracts. The policy was also meant to result in 
lower prices in the domestic market and an overall increase in output. The 
suppressed payroll tax represents 20 percent of the wage bill, 14 percent of the 
legal obligations imposed on regular employment, and a substantial part of the 
total labour costs (see section 3.2). The government claimed that labour costs 
would be reduced without depressing the wage rate or damaging labour rights 
and labour conditions. 
The intended effect on the external competitiveness of Brazilian goods 
was based on the fact that exports were exempted from the revenue tax, thus 
capturing the entire tax reduction. But production for the domestic market was 
also expected to benefit as the substitution of a payroll tax by a revenue tax 
was supposedly not neutral, that is, on average, it decreased the tax burden for 
firms. According to the government, the neutral revenue tax rates would be 
2.32 percent for the textile and garment sectors, 3.28 percent rather than 1 per-
cent for leather and shoe industries, and above 3 percent rather than 2 percent 
for the service sectors (SPE 2013: 21). Therefore, the government estimated 
that the fiscal benefit from the labour tax reform would be BR$ 3.6 billion in 
2012 alone, which represents a 28.4 percent cut in the fiscal burden of all sec-
tors covered by the new policy (SRF 2014: 11).  
The second main objective of the reform was to boost employment. It 
was expected that higher external and internal competitiveness would result in 
more jobs or at least protect jobs from external competitors. In addition, the 
substitution of the payroll tax by a revenue tax was meant to benefit the most 
labour-intensive industries and firms, increasing the potential for job creation 
in the economy. As for formalization, the underlying assumption was that rela-
tively high non-wage labour costs associated with formal employment con-
tracts induces informal employment.  
                                                 
2 They are the Income tax for juridical persons (IRPJ), Social Contribution on the net 
profit (CSLL), Social integration program (PIS/Pasep), Financial contribution for so-
cial security (Cofins), Tax on industrialized products (IPI), Goods and services tax 
(ICMS), Tax on services (ISS) and the CPP. 
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2.3 Background 
The adoption of the new payroll taxation in Brazil had been anticipated by a 
series of political and legislative steps. In the early 1990s the idea that mandato-
ry labour and fiscal charges levied on the payroll bill were causing negative ef-
fects on the labour market gathered momentum (Ansiliero and Paiva 2009). 
Along with a general movement towards deregulation of labour relations, this 
view gained increasing acceptance despite the strong opposition and some level 
of disagreement. 
As a result of this growing acceptance, several pieces of legislation pre-
pared for adoption of the new policy. In 1996, the introduction of the Simples 
Nacional shifted the tax base for Small and Medium Enterprises’ (SMEs’) con-
tribution to social security from the payroll to revenues. At the same time, la-
bour taxation on rural employers shifted from a tax levied on the wage bill to a 
tax on commercialized produce. In 1998, an amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution allowed for different contributions to social security across sectors 
(Government of Brazil 1998), and a few years later, another amendment au-
thorized the substitution of the payroll bill for revenue as the basis for employ-
ers’ tax contribution (Government of Brazil 2002). 
Later on, in 2007, the tripartite National Forum of Pension Fund (FNPS) 
created by the Brazilian Government to examine the need to reform the public 
pension fund agreed with the shift of the tax base provided that the fiscal bal-
ance of the pension fund was secured, without increasing the tax burden. The 
next year, the Government, in a broad proposal for constitutional reform, in-
cluded the provision that the tax on the payroll bill might be replaced by a tax 
on gross revenue to be defined by a federal law. And again in 2008, the Minis-
try of Strategic Affairs made proposals to change labour taxation. That year, 
legislation was approved making exports of IT products exempt from the em-
ployers’ contribution to social security (Ansiliero and Paiva 2009). Thus it is 
possible to say that the shift in the tax base from the payroll bill to the gross 
revenue had gained some political support though this was conditional on the 
guarantee of finance to social security and without damaging labour rights 
(CDES 2011).  
2.4 Economic context 
If in the 1990s a context of slow growth, high unemployment rates, and in-
creasing informality reinforced the discourse favourable to lowering non-wage 
labour costs and payroll taxes in general, the general economic context at the 
time of the policy announcement was quite different. Brazil had experienced 
relatively fast growth rates in the years 2004-2008 (GDP growth rate of 4.8 
percent per year on average), recovered fast from the economic crisis of 2009 
(GDP grew 7.25 percent in 2010), and the economy was growing by 2.7 per-
cent in 2011.  
In 2011 the unemployment rate was relatively low, informality was display-
ing a downward trend, and wages were growing in real terms (Figure 1). Ac-
cording to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the un-
employment rate in August 2011, when the payroll tax change was announced, 
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was, at 6 percent, well below the 9 percent estimated in May 2009 during the 
economic crisis (IBGE 2011).  
Informality in the labour market, measured by the share of workers with-
out social security coverage was above 47 percent in 2011 (Figure 1). In the 
manufacturing sector this percentage was 25.5 percent and was 30 percent in 
the communication sector (which includes IT/ITC). Besides, 22.4 percent of 
salaried workers in non-agricultural activities did not have a formal contract, 
including 5.9 percent domestic workers and 14.6 percent of the urban private 
sector workforce (IBGE 2012: tables 4.1.6 and 4.1.10). However, informality 
has been trending downwards since early 2000 across many sectors, population 
groups and regions (Baltar et al. 2010: 13, Maurizio 2014).  
Wages were increasing, fuelled by the expansion of the domestic market, 
as is suggested by the 2.5 percent real wage increase for registered employees in 
the private sector (IBGE 2011). 
FIGURE 1 
Informality and unemployment in Brazil – 1993-2012 
 
Despite these positive macroeconomic indicators, the performance of the 
manufacturing sector caused some concern. Manufacturing output stagnated in 
2011 with a mere 0.3 percent growth in relation to the previous year only 
helped by better results of the extractive industry. Employment growth was 
also weak in 2011, with a meagre 0.9 percent increase in relation to 2010. In 
fact, growth rates in industrial output and employment were on a downward 
slope since the second quarter of 2010 and were negative for the major manu-
facturing regions in April 2011 (IEDI. 2012). Manufacturing industry branches 
performing particularly badly, with the largest negative indicators, were the tex-
tile industry with a 14.9 percent decrease in output and a -1.1 percent variation 
in employment; leather and shoes (-10.4 percent and -5.0 percent); and the 
garment industry, (-4.4 percent and -3.2 percent, respectively) (IEDI 2012).  
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The Government started the labour tax reform by these manufacturing 
sectors. Table 1 show the sluggish employment growth in the manufacturing 
sectors from 2010 to 2011 and the negative variation from 2011 to 2012, below 
the performance of the economy as a whole. Together with the service sector, 
which was performing better, they represented 3.7 million jobs or 5.3 percent 
of the total formal jobs in the Brazilian economy in 2011. 
TABLE 1 
Employment with a formal contract by sector and total – Brazil –  
2010-2012 
 
The weak performance of the manufacturing sector was related to trade. 
The trade balance of manufactured goods had shifted from a US$ 5 billion 
surplus in the period 2003-2005 to a deficit of US$ 76.7 billion in 2010 due to 
the increase in imports (Cano 2012: 11). Some authors and social actors identi-
fied the overvalued exchange rate and the ‘custo Brasil’3 (‘Brazil’ cost) as the 
main reasons for the difficulties faced by the manufacturing sector (IEDI. 
2012, IMF 2012). The National Confederation of Industrial Employers (CNI) 
attributed part of the loss of competitive edge to high production costs in Bra-
zil, which include labour costs and energy prices, alongside the heavy tax bur-
den, high tax rates, and excessive bureaucracy for business (CNI 2011). 
Despite this dark picture of industrial performance, the payroll tax reform 
raised concerns about the reduction in RGPS’s revenues (Zanghelini et al. 
2013). In 2011, contributions based on the payroll bill reached approximately 
R$ 106.8 billion, or 44 percent of all RGPS revenues. The government estimat-
ed the initial loss of tax revenues at BR$ 7.2 billons in the first year, expecting 
it to reach BR$ 14.11 billion in 2014. These figures give an idea of the impact 
of the tax alleviation for the funding of the private sector pension fund.  
                                                 
3 Custo Brasil is frequently used to mean (high) ‘costs of doing business in Brazil’, and 
includes interest rates, labour costs, transportation costs, tax rates, regulatory system, 
and bureaucracy (The World Bank 1996: iv).   
SECTORS 
2010 2011 2012 Var. 
N. of 
employees 
% tot 
N. of 
employees 
% tot 
N. of 
employees 
% tot 
2010-
2011 
2011-
2012 
Textile 458,244 0.7% 460,126 0.7% 453,433 0.6% 0.4% -1.5% 
Garment 1,089,083 1.6% 1,129,804 1.6% 1,104,875 1.5% 3.7% -2.2% 
Leather and shoes 681,897 1.0% 703,682 1.0% 673,573 0.9% 3.2% -4.3% 
Services 1,275,012 1.9% 1,429,717 2.0% 1,513,634 2.1% 12.1% 5.9% 
Covered sectors 3,504,236 5.3% 3,723,329 5.3% 3,745,515 5.1% 6.3% 0.6% 
Total Employment 66,747,302 100.0% 70,971,125 100.0% 73,326,485 100.0% 6.3% 3.3% 
Source: Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego – RAIS 2011/2012/2013. 
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2.5 Payroll tax reduction - the evidence 
Statistics available for the year 2012 show that the new tax policy lowered the 
tax burden soon after it became valid. For instance, the PIA-Empresa, a large 
industrial survey on manufacturing industries shows that the three manufactur-
ing sectors (textile, leather and shoes, and garment) experienced reductions in 
the ratio between social contributions and the wage bill (Table 2). The same 
survey shows that these contributions were reduced by 19.6 percent in the tex-
tile industry, 38.4 percent in the leather and shoes industry, and 18.1 percent in 
the garment industry from 2011 to 2012.  
TABLE 2 
Contribution to social security as percentage of total wages paid – 
selected sectors – 2008-2012 
 
In addition, the tax administration (SRF) reports that in January 2012 
around 46 percent of the social security contributions collected from the cov-
ered sectors already came from the new tax imposed on gross revenues (SRF 
2014: 14). This indicates that the shift in the tax base from the payroll to gross 
revenue was enforced immediately after the policy was validated. 
INDUSTRIES 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Textile 21.47% 21.74% 22.25% 21.77% 16.49% 
Leather and Shoes 17.83% 17.80% 17.88% 17.33% 9.62% 
Garment 11.99% 10.56% 11.31% 11.85% 8.76% 
Source: IBGE – PIA-Empresa 2012. 
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Chapter 3  
The controversy about social charges and 
payroll tax in Brazil 
The reform of labour taxation in Brazil was preceded by a long and controver-
sial debate among specialists about the size and effects of the social charges 
imposed on labour. The debate was actually not limited to the tax wedge, de-
fined as ‘a measure of the difference between labour costs to the employer and 
the corresponding net take-home pay of the employee and calculated by the 
amount of taxes paid by the employers and employees in relation to wages’ 
(OECD. 2014). It included the size and effects of labour regulation imposed 
on employers related to other components of labour costs.  
Internationally, the theoretical debate about the effect of non-wage labour 
costs on the economy and on the labour market in particular received attention 
in the 1960s (Hart 1984). These costs - all labour costs, including contributions 
to social security programmes but excluding direct remuneration - expanded in 
developed countries mainly due to taxation used to finance the expansion of 
social security programmes after the Great Depression and the Second World 
War (Brittain 1971, Hart 1984, Gruber 1997). More recently, since the 1990s, 
changes in labour and social security legislation have been seeking to reduce 
labour costs of production and improve companies’ competitiveness (Tokman 
and Martínez 1999). 
In Brazil, studies into this also started in the 1960s but intensified in the 
1990s. The Constitution of 1988 introduced new labour and social rights, rais-
ing the level of workers’ protection and strengthening the social security sys-
tem (Amadeo and Camargo 1993). These rights referred to the working time, 
overtime pay rate, maternity leave, vacation allowance, cost of dismissals, and 
previous dismissal notice and some of them represented extra costs levied on 
the payroll bill. (Barros and Corseuil 2004: 276, Pochmann and Santos 1998: 
5).  Besides, the social security system became universal, composed of a retire-
ment and survivor pension fund, unemployment insurance, social assistance, 
and health services, and in part is financed by contributions levied on the pay-
roll bill.  
However, in the early 1990s, the sources of finance for social security be-
came eroded due to high unemployment, increased informality in the labour 
market, and low economic growth (Ansiliero et al. 2008). In this context, some 
authors began discussing the need to change the financing of social security in 
the face of a problem that seemed to be structural. These concerns were con-
nected to the discussion at the international level, coming from recommenda-
tions from international organizations to the adoption of more flexible labour 
regulation and changes in non-wage labour costs (McBride and Williams 2001, 
OECD. 2014).  
Three questions seem to be at the core of the debates: the size of labour 
obligations including the tax wedge, the importance of labour costs for eco-
nomic performance of Brazilian companies, and the relationships between so-
cial charges and informal employment. 
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3.1 Concepts and magnitude of social charges 
According to Pochmann and dos Santos (1998), mandatory contributions im-
posed on employers have been studied since the 1930s and 1940s, when labour 
market institutions became regulated. These authors locate the origin of the 
mainstream concept of labour and social charges defined as ‘any legally im-
posed additional cost levied on the wage paid regardless of its nature and finali-
ty4’ (Pochmann and Santos 1998: 5) in the 1960s. Using this concept, studies 
carried out in the 1970s could not find a common conclusion on the effect of 
payroll taxes and other labour obligations on the labour market (Jorge Jatobá. 
1994, Pochmann and Santos 1998).   
More recently, this concept is found in Pastore (1997: 19-21) who includes 
payments for non-working time imposed by labour regulations, such as pay-
ments for vacations, holidays and weekend leave, to the list of social charges. 
Besides, he considers the contributions to the severance fund FGTS to be a 
payroll tax, even though this item returns to the worker as a deferred compen-
sation in case of unjustified dismissal. The same concept is adopted by Souza 
et al. (2012) who developed a methodology to measure the cost of labour and 
social legislation in Brazil including not only the labour and fiscal costs but also 
the voluntary costs incurred by firms. 
The problem with this line of thinking is that it does not differentiate non-
wage costs according to their nature and purpose, therefore not helping to un-
derstand the implications each of those items may have on labour demand and 
supply. What is particularly problematic is that some costs that are in fact part 
of worker compensation are classified as social charges. 
A different perspective is found in authors that define social charges as a 
tax wedge on the payroll bill that finances the social security system (Santos 
1995, Pochmann and Santos 1998, DIEESE 2011). These charges are distinct 
from labour obligations that make up employee compensation including paid 
non-working time and deferred earnings. 
To understand how these concepts entail different appreciation of the ef-
fects of social charges on the economy, it is necessary to describe in detail the 
mandatory obligations imposed on employers. In general, an employment rela-
tionship in Brazil entails payment of a wage for a standard working time of 44 
hours per week (or less for shift work) including holidays, weekends and one 
month of paid vacations. Vacations are paid at a rate of 133.33 percent of the 
monthly wage. Workers are also entitled to a 13th month salary, received usually 
at the end of the year, or proportionally to the duration of employment in the 
event of dismissal. 
In addition, a severance fund, FGTS, provides workers with cash compen-
sation in the event of unjustified termination, retirement or when the worker 
buys a house. Employers have to contribute 8 percent of wage monthly to the 
FGTS; this corresponds to one monthly wage per year of employment. On top 
                                                 
4 Translated by the author. 
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of this, in the event of unjustified dismissal by the employer, there is a penalty 
fee of 50 percent of the amount already deposited in the Fund.  
Employees must be notified of impending dismissal at least 30 days prior 
to the termination. Recently this period has become proportional to the dura-
tion of employment, increasing by 3 days per year on top of the thirty-day 
basic period. After notification the employee may work two hours less per day 
than the regular working time in order to find a new job.  
Firms which fall under neither the Simples nor the new labour tax policy 
also pay the employers contribution for social security (CPP, also called contri-
bution to the INSS). Other taxes are added to the CPP: workplace injury insur-
ance (2 percent, on average), contribution to public education (2.5 percent), 
contribution to the National Institute of Agrarian Reform and to the Industrial 
or Commercial Social and Training Services (SESI, SESC, SENAI, SENAC) 
and to the Brazilian Agency for Micro and Small Enterprise (SEBRAE) that in 
total amount to 3.3 percent of the payroll bill. The sum of these contributions 
is equal to a tax rate of 27.8 percent levied on the payroll bill (DIEESE 2011: 
5), as can be calculated from Table 3 by dividing BR$ 308.89 by the wage bill 
of BR$ 1,111.11. 
TABLE 3  
Total expenditure necessary to employ a worker 
 receiving a hypothetical wage of BR$ 1.000,00 per month 
 
 
Based on the concept of social charges as the fiscal wedge on labour, 
DIEESE (2011) and other authors (Santos 1995, Pochmann and Santos 1998) 
calculate these charges in 25.1 percent of direct and deferred compensation. In 
this compensation package are included the deposits on the FGTS and other 
ITEM 
Expenditure in 
BR$ 
1. Contractual wage  1,000.00 
2. 13th wage (end of year) and 1/3 wage vacation additional (monthly 
proportion) 
 111.11 
3. Wage bill – basis of employer’s monthly contribution to social 
security 
 1,111.11 
4. FGTS - Seniority fund and dismissal fee  118.00 
5. Employee monthly average earnings (3+4)  1,229.11 
6. Employer social contributions based on (3)  308.89 
6.1 – CPP (INSS): 20.0% 222.22  
6.2 – Labor accident insurance (2% in average) 22.22  
6.3 – Education-wage tax (2.5%) 27.78  
6.4 – INCRA (0.2%) 2.22  
6.5 –SESI or SESC (1.5%) 16.67  
6.6 – SESI or SENAC (1.0%) 11.11  
6.7 – SEBRAE (0.6%) 6.67  
7. Total employer expenditure (5+6)  1,538.00 
Source: DIEESE 2011:5 
12 
 
mandatory payments due in the event of dismissal. Thus, the CPP alone repre-
sents 14.45 percent of the mandatory labour costs associated with a formal 
employment relationship (calculated by dividing BR$ 222.22 by BR$ 1,538.00 
in Table 3). 
Pastore (1996, 1997: 19-21) estimates that mandatory labour and social ob-
ligations on formal employment cost 102 percent of the per working hour 
wage rate. This is because he adds the cost of non-worked hours of 51.7 per-
cent of the direct remuneration. In any case, with his calculation in mind, the  
CPP represents 27.6 percent of the total employment costs (wage plus manda-
tory non-wage costs) and its elimination cuts the mandatory labour costs by 
13.7 percent, which is very close to the figure arrived at using the DIEESE cal-
culation method. 
Souza et al. (2012) estimated that the CPP represents 8.2 – 8.6 percent of 
the total labour costs including mandatory and voluntary labour costs for firms 
in the textile sector. Thus, even considering other labour costs besides those 
legally imposed on employers, the payroll tax cut was not, in theory, negligible. 
This study will not seek to propose a new concept for social charges or 
solve the polemic among authors. However, based on these different concepts 
and related measurements outlined above, it is possible to say that the payroll 
tax reduction adopted in 2012 represents 14 percent of the mandatory labour 
and tax obligations imposed on a formal contract, and less than this percentage 
if the total labour costs is taken into consideration. Moreover, the tax reform 
changed the fiscal wedge on the payroll bill without changing the compensa-
tion for work as it has not affected social security benefits. 
3.2 Non-wage labour costs and competitiveness 
Beyond measurement and classification of non-wage costs, the core of the po-
lemic seems to be around whether mandatory non-wage labour costs reduce 
the competitiveness of Brazilian firms and negatively affect employment.  
On one side, Pastore (1997: 19) argues that social charges are an excessive 
burden on formal employment and that Brazilian labour institutions are too 
rigid. In his words, in Brazil worker earnings are low but labour costs are high, 
emphasizing the share of non-wage costs in the total labour costs. Going even 
further, in his view workers and employers would be better off if they could 
bargain directly over some of the social charges, allowing for quick adaptation 
to economic shocks and increases in workers’ earnings. This last conclusion is 
based on the idea that payroll taxes are shifted onto labour by a decrease in 
wages. The policy implication would then be to allow for collective bargaining 
to set lower standards than the legally imposed ones (the Brazilian labour code 
allows for collectively negotiated standards to be more favourable for workers 
than the legal standard). 
On the other side, Santos (1995), DIEESE (1997), Pochmann and Santos 
(1998) share the view that labour costs are not a cause of low competitiveness 
by Brazilian firms. Comparative statistics showing that hourly labour costs in 
the manufacturing industry in Brazil in 1993 were US$ 2.68 per hour, higher 
than countries such as Mexico (US$ 2.41) and Hungary (US$ 1.82), but below 
Hong Kong (US$ 4.21), South Korea (US$ 4.93), Taiwan (US$ 5.46), US (US$ 
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16.40), Germany (US$ 24.87), and a long list of developed countries (DIEESE 
1997: 26). These authors also emphasize that social charges in Brazil cost in the 
mid-1990s around RS$ 0.62 per hour, far lower than the US$ 5.00 in Germany 
and US$ 3.00 in the US (Pochmann and Santos 1998: 14-15). They conclude 
that social charges are not excessively high in Brazil, do not result in high la-
bour costs, and do not damage the external or domestic competitiveness of 
Brazilian manufactured goods. Moreover, they foresee a threat to labour and 
social rights coming from proposals that intend to reduce labour costs by 
changing social charges.  
The labour tax policy of 2012 seems to be aligned with the view that la-
bour costs in Brazil are relatively high, thus undermining the competitiveness 
of exports. According to the US Bureau of Labour Statistics, manufacturing 
unit labour cost in Brazil increased from US$ 5.01 in 2005 to US$ 11.67 in 
2011 (see Appendices 2 and 3, US Bureau of Labour Statistics 2014). Besides, 
there are indications that the fiscal burden on wages is high in comparison with 
other developing countries. However, the same source confirms that total 
manufacturing labour costs in Brazil are still one of the lowest among 34 de-
veloped and developing countries suggesting that labour costs and social 
charges may not be the single or most important factor to affect competitive-
ness in face of the appreciated exchange rate, high real interest rates, and defi-
ciencies in infrastructure. 
3.3 Social charges and informality 
In connection to the above, some authors discuss the relationship between la-
bour market institutions, including payroll taxation, and informality.  The ques-
tion is whether the labour and fiscal wedge is so high that it induces employers 
and workers to engage in informal work arrangements. 
Different views are found among authors who consider that the fiscal 
wedge on formal employment is conducive to informality. Neri (2000), for in-
stance, found that formal and informal employment contracts do not differ in 
relation to compliance to the minimum wage, the limit to working hours, dates 
for payment or annual bonuses. However, when it comes to social security 
coverage, only 7.7 percent of unregistered employees contribute to social secu-
rity, in contrast with the 100 percent among registered employees (Neri 2000: 
40). For him ‘informality in Brazil is, mainly, a fiscal phenomenon, as ‘high 
payroll taxes levied on the wage bill and the programs that they finance stimu-
late tax evasion and informality’ (Neri 2000: 41). In relation to the social pro-
grammes financed by payroll taxes, Neri considers that the tax/benefit links 
are not close. In a nutshell, he points out that some minimum social security 
benefits are universal and do not require previous contributions.  
Carneiro (1997) explains the expansion of the informal economy and in-
formality in the labour market in the 1990s as the result of excessive govern-
ment intervention and structural changes in the economy. Government inter-
vention is evidenced in the increasingly complex taxation systems and heavier 
tax burden on formal firms and employment contracts. In addition, the eco-
nomic crisis in the 1990s, together with technological changes, replaced the 
manufacturing sector with the service sector as the centre of economic dyna-
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mism. As the service sector is regarded as more flexible and less subject to 
government control, it is also more conducive to informal work arrangements. 
Some authors contest the idea that informality is the result of tax evasion 
(Ansiliero et al. 2008). If it was so, they argue, wages for informal workers 
would be higher than for similar employees formally hired. Yet wages are high-
er and other employment conditions are better for registered employees. Based 
on this evidence, they argue that formal and informal segments of the labour 
market are highly segmented and a simple reduction in the level of tax rates 
might not affect the level of informality particularly for ‘small and weak entre-
preneurs that are on the fringes of informality’ (Ansiliero et al. 2008: 24). 
In summary, the debate hinges on whether workers and employers shift 
employment from formal to informal arrangements due to changes in non-
wage labour costs. While some authors say that this shift is smooth, others 
contend it by saying that other factors determine informality. There is thus no 
consensus as to whether a tax reduction would lead to a conversion of infor-
mal jobs into formal ones. This is an empirical question that may be difficult to 
measure at the level of the firm as it would involve obtaining information 
about illegal practices such as unregistered employment. Therefore, it is likely 
that formalization of jobs may appear in the labour statistics as employment 
generation. 
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Chapter 4   
Theories of  employment and wage 
determination 
The theoretical debate about labour taxation has been focused of the effects of 
taxation on economic efficiency which translates into the question of the effect 
of such taxes on employment.  
4.1 The neoclassical framework 
According to the neoclassical framework (Hart 1984, Ehrenberg and Smith 
2006: 76-78), the effect of a payroll tax on the labour market depends on the 
interaction between labour demand and supply. Under the assumption that 
firms maximize profits, the output is set at a point in which the marginal reve-
nue is equal to the marginal cost. In the short run, when other factors are fixed, 
it is assumed that the marginal productivity of labour is declining, as adding 
more units of labour will result in smaller changes in the output. Firms hire 
workers up to the point that the marginal revenue product of labour equals 
marginal labour expenditure, which is given by the wage rate (Ehrenberg and 
Smith 2006: 65).  
When a payroll tax is imposed on employers, this non-wage labour cost 
raises marginal labour expenditure above the marginal revenue product of la-
bour. The theory argues that the firm will then reduce labour demand to in-
crease the marginal revenue product of labour and re-equalize it with the wage 
rate. The labour demand curve shifts inwards and unless the tax burden is 
shifted onto labour by a lower wage, employment will be diminished. 
In the long run, when other factors can change, an increase in the wage 
rate affects employment by the substitution effect and scale effect. The substi-
tution effect means that a higher price for the labour input induces the profit 
maximizing firm to substitute capital for labour equating the respective mar-
ginal productivities with the new ratio of input prices.  The scale effect implies 
that higher production costs entail a lower level of output at which profit is 
maximized. Both effects interact to shift the demand curve inwards (Ehrenberg 
and Smith 2006: 70-73).  
The final outcome, according to this theory, will also depend on the sensi-
tivity of labour supply to wages. If labour supply is inelastic, under the assump-
tion that the economy works at full employment, especially in the long-run, 
workers will accept a fall in wages in order to avoid unemployment (Brittain 
1971, Hamermesh 1993: 172). Thus, equilibrium is achieved at the same em-
ployment level and the tax burden is completely or almost completely shifted 
onto workers.  
However, Hamermesh (1979) argues that the primary adult male labour 
force may have an inelastic supply function, but this is not true for the supply 
of the secondary labour-force (female, young workers). It is possible also to 
think that the supply of labour for the formal segment of the labour market 
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particularly in a developing country is elastic due to the large informal segment 
and long term unemployment. In this case, the presence of a tax levied on em-
ployers does not shift entirely onto labour and employment is set at a lower 
level that depends on the elasticities of demand and supply for labour. 
In addition, some authors introduce the link between taxes and benefits as 
a factor that may have a bearing on the final outcome (Summers 1989, Gruber 
1997). If the introduction of a payroll tax is associated with a benefit perceived 
by workers as part of the compensation package, there will be an outward shift 
of the labour supply curve. Hence, the new equilibrium will occur at a lower 
money wage rate and a smaller job destruction effect. The final effect, there-
fore, depends on how much the benefit associated with the payroll tax is val-
ued by workers. 
The reverse case of a reduction in a payroll tax under the neoclassical 
framework implies an outward shift of the labour demand curve towards a 
higher employment level illustrated in the graph below by the move of DL0 to 
DL1. As the labour supply curve in this case is elastic, the clearing wage can be 
set at a higher level w1.  The market clearing wage and employment levels are 
set depending on the elasticities of labour supply and demand. In addition, if 
the payroll tax reduction is not liked to a reduction in the benefits, hence in the 
compensation package, the labour supply curve does not shift.  
FIGURE 2 
The effects of a payroll tax reduction 
 
  
Source: based on Summers (1989: 180). 
Considering the framework presented above and conceiving the labour 
supply for formal activities in developing countries to be elastic, a tax reduction 
then implies an increase in employment and a less than proportional increase in 
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wages (partial shifting), particularly when labour supply curve is not affected by 
changes in the social security benefits. 
In the specific case under analysis in this paper, social security benefits 
were not changed, there was a large informal sector and long-term unemploy-
ment, and the policy covered a limited number of sectors. Hence, the supply 
curve may be thought of as elastic and it may be expected that policy effects 
will be positive on the formal employment and also positive but to a lesser ex-
tent, on wages. 
Another important assumption for the standard neoclassical approach is 
that a payroll tax reduction is offset by a neutral tax so that government reve-
nues and spending do not change (Hamermesh 1993: 167). This is not the case 
in this study, as the tax substitution was not neutral (see Section 2.1). In partic-
ular, for exporting firms the tax burden was clearly reduced to zero.  
4.2 Imperfect competition and institutional factors 
A different theoretical perspective is found in Nickell and Layard (1999), who 
introduce institutional factors, the market structure and the collective bargain-
ing process to explain the effects of payroll taxation. In their model, wages are 
first determined by collective bargaining, with outcomes influenced by the rela-
tive power of trade unions, the unemployment rate, and the labour productivi-
ty at the level of the firm. Once the wage rate is set by collective agreement, the 
firm unilaterally fixes the employment level in order to maximize profits. 
Hence, during the period between tax reduction and wage bargaining wages are 
constant and it is likely that employment will increase. The final outcome also 
depends on the firm’s power to influence the output market by increasing 
profit margins or expanding production (Bennmarker et al. 2009). 
It is worth noting in relation to institutional factors that collective bargain-
ing in Brazil sets the basic, initial wage for each sector at the local level. Even 
though less than 20 percent of the workforce is unionized, collective agree-
ments cover almost the total registered workforce. Therefore, it is possible to 
assume that the collective bargaining processes is relevant to the wage-setting 
process. As local negotiation takes place annually in a specific month of the 
year, with a high concentration of negotiations in May, these negotiations 
might have reflected the tax policy change immediately after the new tax law 
was adopted in January 2012.  
If collective bargaining may forestall decreases in wages when a payroll tax 
is imposed, it may also impel wages to grow if a tax is reduced (Cruces et al. 
2010). However, in Brazil collective agreements set the basic wage for all firms 
regardless of the applicable tax regime. Thus, if a payroll tax change affects on-
ly some firms under the same collective agreement the wage-setting process 
may not reflect the tax benefit. 
Therefore, the elastic supply of labour, the characteristic of tax reduction 
without changes in the compensation package, the non-neutral tax substitution, 
and the institutional factors in the Brazilian labour market, all reinforce the hy-
pothesis above of an increase in employment and partial shifting on wages due 
to the new tax laws. 
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Chapter 5  
Empirical studies 
Several approaches have been adopted to test the validity of the theories 
summarized above, particularly to elucidate the effects of labour taxation on 
economic performance and on the labour market. A literature review revealed 
papers that have relied on time-series analysis, cross-country analysis, and, 
most frequently, panel data analysis. The following review positions the meth-
od chosen for the present study in relation to these approaches, giving especial 
attention to panel data analysis in studies conducted in Latin America in gen-
eral and Brazil in particular.  
5.1 Cross-section and time-series analysis 
The literature includes cross-country analysis performed to obtain general-
izable knowledge of the effect of payroll taxes on the labour market. For in-
stance Brittain (1971) analysed variation in payroll tax rates across a sample of 
64 nations and a refined sub-sample of 30 countries, concluding that increases 
in the payroll tax are fully converted into a decrease in wages with no effect on 
value added or employment. Several questions are raised in relation to this kind 
of work, like the limited number of countries and the omission of relevant var-
iables other than taxation. Despite the merits of a general appreciation of pay-
roll tax effects, the study of a particular case seems to need an approach that 
takes into consideration the national economic and institutional specificities.  
A second possibility is to apply time-series analysis as carried out by 
Hamermesh (1979). This author studies the backward shifting of a payroll tax 
rate paid by employers for OASDHI (Old Age, Survivors, Disability, and 
Health Insurance) in the US. Based on a panel of 587 adult men, divided into 
two groups by age, with data for from 1967 to 1973 he observed the variation 
of the effective payroll tax rate in relation to wages. As the tax rate is decreas-
ing on the share of workers with wages above the tax base ceiling, he conclud-
ed that only 36 percent of the change in the tax burden is shifted onto labour. 
Hamermesh suggests that this small shifting is due to ‘the elastic supply of 
marginal labor-force participants’ intervening with the wage determination 
(Hamermesh 1979: 1217).  It can be argued that the challenges for this ap-
proach are the need to consider other factors that influence wage behaviour 
over time and to have a longer time series.  
5.2 The use of panel data in the study of labour 
taxation 
Panel data is perhaps best suited to analysing the direct effect of tax 
changes on the labour market. An influential paper that examined this issue in 
the Latin American context is offered by Gruber (1997). His paper analyses the 
effect of a cut in the employers’ payroll tax of 22.5 percentage points, on aver-
age, in Chile in the early 1980s, following the privatization of the Social Securi-
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ty and Disability Insurance programmes. Data from an industrial survey for the 
years 1979-1980 and 1984-1985 are used to compare outcomes before and af-
ter the reform. In the study, a triple difference approach is adopted including 
not only the change within the firm across time, but also comparing the effects 
of the effective tax rate on blue collar/white collar workers. A major challenge 
facing the author was that the reform was universal, so there was no control 
group that had not been exposed to the reform. Hence, the effect of the pay-
roll tax cut was estimated by observing the correlation between the effective 
payroll tax rate, calculated by dividing the tax paid by the wage bill, and the 
wage and employment levels before and after the reform. It was found that the 
wage coefficient for the tax rate was close to one, suggesting that the tax cut 
fully shifted on to workers by a proportional increase in wages, whereas the 
employment coefficient was not significant (Gruber 1997: 594-595). 
Two points drawn from this study seem particularly useful. First, a payroll 
tax cut may have different effects on administrative and production workers 
due to differences in the valuation of social security benefits by each group 
(Gruber 1997: 594). The study shows that payroll tax shifted fully onto produc-
tion workers, but the shifting was even more than full for white collar workers. 
Even though in the Brazilian case the payroll tax cut was not associated with a 
change in the social security benefits as it was in Chile, it seems important to 
know whether effects were similar for both categories of workers. Second, a 
substantial mandatory wage increase influenced the estimated effects of the 
payroll tax cut on wages in Chile. Again, in relation to the Brazilian case, it is 
worth noting that in January 2012 the minimum wage was raised by 14.4 per-
cent and this factor has to be considered in the analysis.  
A similar approach is taken by Kugler and Kugler (2008) in a study of the 
effects of a payroll tax rise in Colombia in 1993. The paper’s empirical strategy 
relies on exploiting temporal variations in the effective tax rate at sector and 
plant level to identify wage and employment effects. They analyse changes in 
the variables using data from 1982 to 1996, comparing pairs of years at similar 
points of the economic cycle, whether recessionary or expansionary. Adopting 
a difference-in-differences approach, the estimates show that a 10 percent in-
crease in taxation leads to 4-5 percent decline in employment and 1.4 o 2.3 
percent reduction in wages. They also find a weaker effect on wages and a 
stronger effect on unemployment for production workers compared to non-
production workers. 
The results of these studies on Chile and Colombia suggest the possibility 
of asymmetric effects on employment and wages depending on whether the 
payroll tax is increased or reduced. In the first case, the tax cut in Chile led to a 
full shifting onto labour and no employment effects. In Colombia, contrarily, a 
payroll tax increase resulted in partial shifting with employment effects. These 
asymmetric effects raise the question of whether wage rigidity prevents a full 
shifting when the payroll tax is imposed, while shifting is not blocked when the 
payroll tax is cut. 
A third study of the effects of changes in labour taxation in Argentina in 
the second half of the 1990s is provided by Cruces et al. (2010). In this coun-
try, payroll tax rates were reduced in some regions with the aim of stimulating 
employment and economic development. The empirical strategy explores the 
regional differentiation of tax rates to evaluate the policy through the method 
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of difference-in-differences. Instead of the effective tax rate, the study uses the 
applicable legal tax rate for groups of firms across regions, avoiding problems 
of reverse causality and measurement errors. Conversely to the Chilean study, 
the results show a partial shift onto wages, of 0.5 percent in wages for each 
percentage point less in the tax rate and no significant employment effect 
(Cruces et al. 2010: 747). 
Another regional experiment of labour tax policies aimed at stimulating 
growth in a quite different economic and social context was studied by Benn-
marker et al. (2009). These authors study a 10 percentage point reduction in 
payroll tax for firms in the northern part of Sweden in 2002. They explore 
changes over time and across sectors using differences in the effective tax rates 
between covered and uncovered regions to identify causal relationships. How-
ever, as the tax reduction had a cap value, it was not linear on the wage bill, 
therefore potentially resulting in reverse causality between the wage bill and the 
tax rate. To avoid this problem, the authors instrumented the effective tax rate 
with an interaction term between time and the regional legal tax rate. The study 
is based on a firm-level data set with 81,269 observations for the period 2001-
2004 in which firms were identified by sector and municipality covered by the 
policy. The findings for existing companies are not statistically significant for 
employment, but suggest that wages increased by 0.23 percent for each per-
centage point reduction in the tax rate, suggesting partial shifting. However, 
when the analysis included the entry and exit of firms, then a positive and sig-
nificant estimate is obtained suggesting that the payroll tax cut increases em-
ployment.  
Drawing from the above, panel data analysis using the method of differ-
ence-in-differences is suitable for the kind of evaluation that is intended here. 
Instead of the effective payroll tax rate, some authors (Cruces et al. 2010, 
Bennmarker et al. 2009)  use the legal tax rage as explanatory variable. This line 
will be followed here, by the use of the tax regime and associated tax rate to 
explain employment and wages. The tax regime will be the basis for building a 
counterfactual for the treatment, as in the Brazilian case there was no regional 
differentiation and comparison between sectors may not allow for credible 
counterfactuals.  
5.3 Empirical studies about the Brazilian labour tax 
reform 
Turning towards studies about the payroll tax reduction in Brazil, FGV 
Projetos (2013) and Dallava (2014) analyse empirically its effects on employ-
ment and wages. Both studies adopt the applicable mandated tax rate as the 
independent variable and apply difference-in-differences technique, but each 
study relies on different data sets and also differ in terms of identification strat-
egies and results. 
The study conducted by FGV Projetos (2013) is in fact composed of three 
parts: a prospective analysis based on a computable general equilibrium model 
(CGE), a regression analysis of employment and trade effects, and a qualitative 
survey of businessmen’s opinions and expectations.  
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The CGE component is intended to assess the macroeconomic effects of 
the payroll tax reduction on the economy, beyond the directly affected sectors. 
In this part, the study concludes that the labour tax reform in 2012 increases 
exports by 0.88 percent, this being the main driver for a 0.4 percent growth in 
total employment, this growth occurring primarily in the IT/ITC sector and its 
supply chain linkages (FGV Projetos 2013: 14).  
The second part of FGV’s study is dedicated to the econometric analysis 
of the direct effects of the payroll tax reduction in the covered sectors. Arguing 
that uncovered sectors are not good counterfactuals, the authors opted to de-
velop synthetic control groups whose trajectory of employment in the pre-
treatment period was similar to the treated groups. Hence, after the treatment, 
the only difference between the treated and the synthetic control group would 
be the exposure to the change in labour taxation. For the garment, shoes and 
leather industries, the virtual control groups were built from uncovered manu-
facturing sectors, whereas for the IT/ITC sector, the synthetic groups were 
drawn from other service sectors. The synthetic groups were estimated using 
monthly data on employment and wages from 2007 to 2011 sourced from the 
General Record of Employed and Unemployed (CAGED). 
A possible shortcoming of this strategy is that all firms in the same sector 
were included in the treatment group, regardless of the tax regime. However, 
as noted in section 2.1 above, firms under the Simples were not affected by the 
2012 tax reform. By doing this, it is possible that the measured effect of the 
payroll tax reduction in the treatment group is biased downwards by the pres-
ence of a large share of non-covered firms in the treatment group. 
The results obtained by FGV show a relatively small increase in the em-
ployment level and a more substantial rise in wages. As for the employment 
level, the estimates are significant at 10 percent of confidence interval in the 
shoes and garment industries, with a 2.2 percent and 2.1 percent increase in 
total employment respectively. For the leather industry and IT/ITC sector, the 
estimates were not significant, though positive with a 3.6 percent and 0.9 per-
cent increase respectively (FGV Projetos 2013: 89). The findings suggest that 
the effect on employment was mainly due to job destruction (firings) than an 
increase in new jobs. It calls attention to the fact that the labour-intensive 
IT/ITC sector did not react strongly to this substantial decrease in the labour 
costs.  
As for the effects on wages, results are presented disaggregated to workers 
with intermediary or university education levels. Workers with intermediary 
schooling or less saw their wages increased by 1.7 percent in the shoes indus-
try, 2.7 percent in the leather industry, and by 1.5 percent in the garment sec-
tor. Wages paid to highly educated workers were raised by 9.2 percent in the 
leather industry, 5.5 percent in the garment industry, and 5.9 percent in the 
IT/ITC sector. These larger and statistically significant estimates suggest a par-
tial shifting onto labour. However, the summation of both effects falls short of 
the potential reduction of 20 percent of the wage bill. 
The third part of the study by FGV is an opinion survey among 81 firms, 
mostly medium and large, and members of industrial associations representing 
the covered sectors. From the extensive set of answers, it is worth mentioning 
that the effects on labour costs and total costs are considered moderate, that it 
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is not clear whether the policy results in a reduction of informal labour, and 
that resources freed from taxation are expected to be channelled towards wage 
increases rather than employment generation (FGV Projetos 2013: 17). 
A second relevant study carried out by Dallava (2014) adopts a strategy 
hinged on comparisons between establishments in covered and uncovered sec-
tors. Her analysis relies on administrative records of formal employment, pro-
vided by the Annual Roll of Social Information (RAIS). She does not have in-
formation from the firm level and this is a limitation for comparisons between 
covered and uncovered firms. She tries to overcome this limitation using avail-
able information about characteristics of the establishments5. She considers 
employment contracts held by establishments located in the same municipality, 
with same size, economic activity, and juridical nature, as being associated with 
the same firm. Based on this assumption, she formed clusters of employment 
contracts to represent firms and assigned these clusters to treatment and con-
trol groups depending on whether the economic sector is covered or not by 
the tax policy. The treatment group consists of 38,579 clusters from 193 eco-
nomic sub-classes of four economic sections, whereas the control group is 
formed by 545,738 clusters of 530 sub-classes of the same section of the na-
tional classification of economic activities (CNAE)6 (Dallava 2014: 41).  
To analyse these data, Dallava applies a difference-in-differences method-
ology, observing the variation in employment and wages before (in 2011) and 
after the policy was adopted (in 2012). It is important to note, however, that 
most of the industries included in the analysis were covered by the policy in 
April and August 2012, so that the estimates may have been influenced by a 
policy coverage limited in time to a few months. In addition, the use of clusters 
from uncovered economic sectors as counterfactuals may pose an identifica-
tion problem, as sector-specific factors may vary with time and lead to biased 
estimates (Khandker 2010: 75). 
The findings for employment are positive and statistically significant only 
for the information and communication industry, suggesting that the payroll 
tax cut increased employment by 4.3 percent. In the case of the accommoda-
tion and food services sectors, the coefficient associated with employment is 
also significant but negative (6.5 percent). For the effect on wages, the infor-
mation and communication sector appears to have reacted to the policy by in-
creasing wages by 2.33 percent, as did the administrative and complementary 
services sector, with an average rise of 5.25 percent. It is worth noting that for 
the manufacturing sector the estimates are not significant even though this sec-
tor is a primary target of the policy (Dallava 2014: 42). 
In her model specification she includes averages of age, schooling, tenure, 
share of permanent employees, and male workers, as control variables. While 
average age and proportion of male workers are negatively associated with the 
                                                 
5 Establishments here may mean a small firm or a subsidiary of a larger firm which 
had a job contract under the national tax code (Cadastro Nacional da Pessoa Jurídica – 
CNPJ). 
6 CNAE is compatible with the International Standard Industrial Classification of all 
Economic Activities – ISIC 4 and has five levels: 21 Sections, 87 Divisions,  
285 Groups, 673 Classes, and 1,301 Subclasses (IBGE. 2014). 
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increase in employment and positively with the wage rise, a stronger influence 
comes from the level of schooling on wages only (Dallava 2014: 43-46). The 
problem here may be of reverse causality, as a payroll tax cut affects employ-
ment through an expansion in the demand for specific groups of workers, for 
instance women and young workers. If so, by including these control variables 
in the model, she may have biased the estimates.  
As for the results, these two studies show ambiguous estimates of em-
ployment and wage effects. Dallava finds small, positive, and statistically signif-
icant coefficients only for wages and employment in the IT&ITC sector, 
whereas in the manufacturing sector coefficients are not significant (Dallava 
2014: 42-43). Conversely, FGV Projetos indicates positive and significant coef-
ficients for employment in the shoes and garment industries, but not signifi-
cant in the leather industry and IT&ITC sector (FGV Projetos 2013: 89-91). 
The effect on wages seems to be more substantial and significant in the latter 
study for most sectors. 
In order to overcome the limitations found in the literature just reviewed 
the identification strategy relies on the fact that firms within the same sector 
may or may not be covered by the policy according to the tax regime in which 
they fell when the policy was introduced. Similar to the above the methodolog-
ical approach in this research uses panel data analysis and difference-in-
differences technique but with firm level data so that it is possible to difference 
out time invariant effects at the firm level. 
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Chapter 6  
Empirical strategy 
As indicated above, this empirical analysis intends to evaluate the effects of the 
payroll tax reduction on employment, working hours, and wage levels, in the 
sectors covered by the policy. The outcome variables are the number of em-
ployment contracts during the year, the annual number of working hours, and 
the average hourly wage in Brazilian Reais, per firm. The explanatory variable 
of interest is binary, indicating whether a firm was covered by the payroll tax 
reform in 2012 or not. According to Brazilian legislation, firms not under the 
Simples Nacional regime were covered by the policy. 
6.1 Identifying assumption and empirical approach 
The identification problem comes from the fact that one cannot observe em-
ployment, hours of work, and hourly wages in a non-Simples firm that oper-
ates in a covered industry in the absence of the payroll tax reduction after the 
policy was adopted. For such a firm, it is only possible to measure changes in 
the variables of interest in the presence of a tax cut. Therefore, it is necessary 
to build a credible control group to be used as a counterfactual that allows for 
the identification of what would have happened to firms if they had not been 
covered by the policy.  
This paper will explore the fact that the policy has not covered firms un-
der the Simples regime, which were already exempted from the CPP before the 
policy change. Therefore, it is possible to construct a potentially valid control 
group from Simples firms and compare their performance with the non-
Simples firms, that is, the group under treatment. 
The question is whether employment, working hours and wages are af-
fected by the policy. A simple comparison between covered and uncovered 
firms may lead to biased results, due to the effect of unobserved factors that 
are likely to be related to the treatment and also to the outcomes. For instance, 
more efficient firms may have higher revenues making them ineligible to apply 
for the Simples regime. Even if time variant factors like aggregate shocks, sec-
tor specific shocks and regional shocks that affect both treatment and control 
groups are included, the identification strategy requires consideration of time-
invariant unobserved covariates that distinguish the two groups of firms. A 
difference-in-differences strategy with a fixed effect model will be used to ad-
dress this problem, as it includes unobserved factors in the model so that the 
treatment and the error term will not be correlated. This will result in credible 
estimates of the policy effects. 
This strategy relies on some conditions. First, it is assumed that, condi-
tional on the covariates, the single change that affected firms in one group and 
not the other was the tax change. An investigation in the literature available 
and interviews with government officials, employers, experts and one account-
ant give support to this assumption. Besides, the tax change is additive and 
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constant as the employers’ payroll contribution had the same rate and same tax 
base across firms. 
The empirical approach rests on the critical parallel trend assumption, 
meaning that treatment and control groups would perform similarly over time 
in the absence of the policy. As Khandker explains, this assumption states that 
‘unobserved characteristics affecting program participation do not vary over 
time with treatment status’ (Khandker 2010: 73). For instance, differences be-
tween firms in the treatment and control groups regarding entrepreneurial abil-
ity, productivity, and technology, that result in the applicable tax regime can be 
considered fixed over a one-year period of time.  
Thus, the analysis will start by checking whether the parallel trend assump-
tion holds. First, it will be observed whether outcome variables trended similar-
ly for treatment and control groups during a specific period of time before the 
treatment. As an additional check, placebo regressions will be performed by 
regressing the outcome variables on the tax regime using data from 2010 and 
2011, pretending that non-Simples firms were exposed to treatment in 2011. 
The sign and significance of the coefficients for treatment will suggest whether 
firms in both groups are, on average, performing differently than they were 
before the policy adoption.    
The time dimension is introduced by a selection of a balanced panel of 
firms that existed, or rather, that held employment contracts, before (2011) and 
after (2012) the policy implementation. Hence, firms in both treatment and 
control groups were exposed to similar aggregate shocks such as GDP growth, 
aggregate labour demand, and national minimum wage adjustment.  
Dealing with firms that entered or left the market is more complex as a 
number of intervening factors other than the change in labour taxation come 
into play. Given that the data base will not help to control for these various 
confounding factors, the study focuses on the effects on firms which existed in 
both periods and the analysis is based on a balanced panel of firms. 
Firms were included in the study if classified in one of the following 
CNAE groups:  
 Textile industry – CNAE division 13 
 Garment industry – CNAE division 14 
 Leather and shoes industry – CNAE division 15 
 IT and ITC – CNAE division 62 and Group 631 
 Call centre services – CNAE class 8220.2 
The last two sectors were aggregated and labelled Service sectors in this study. 
In addition to sector specific shocks that firms have to respond to, the 
sectors included in the study are heterogeneous in terms of nature of activity 
(manufacturing, services), firm size, main product market (domestic, export), 
technology, and factor intensity, among others. Sectoral heterogeneity and spe-
cific shocks are dealt with by controlling for sector-specific effects. The as-
sumption is that sectoral shocks affect firms in both groups over time and the 
analysis takes into account the sector as a control variable. 
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Brazil is a large country and economic performance may be influenced by 
locational aspects. As the regional location of firms does not vary over time, 
the empirical strategy will deal with regional aspects by differencing them out 
as fixed factors. 
However, different firms may react differently to the same sectoral or re-
gional shock. Larger firms may, for example, have more access to capital, ac-
cess to external markets, subsidiaries near larger markets, and may be oligopo-
listic in their product markets; characteristics not observed in small and micro 
firms. In order to reduce this sort of heterogeneity between treatment and con-
trol groups, the analysis will first be carried out using a sub-sample of firms 
that, as a baseline, had less than 50 employees. Subsequently, the analysis will 
lift the imposed firm’s size limit to check the sensitivity of estimates when larg-
er firms are included in the sample. 
As the policy change occurred in January 2012, the year 2011 will be the 
baseline and 2012 will be considered as the period after treatment. Annual av-
erage values for dependent and independent variables will help to avoid inter-
ference of seasonality in the analysis. Although the policy was announced in 
August 2011, firms knew that if passed by Congress it would be implemented 
in January. In order to chech if firms anticipated employment decisions and 
begin hiring workers in 2011, the study examines data from 2010 for firms that 
existed at least one year before the treatment and also existed in 2012. 
A second robustness check will be performed by excluding from the sam-
ple firms from the textile sector which was covered as of April 2012. If the re-
sults are consistent with expectations, removing these latecomers is likely to 
produce larger coefficients for the main variable than when all sectors are in-
cluded. 
Firms were assigned to treatment and control groups depending on their 
tax regime, non-Simples or Simples respectively, in 2012. Firms may shift from 
one tax regime to the other depending on various factors not limited to the 
associated tax burden. As this is a time variant factor, shifts in tax regime are 
controlled for through a dummy variable indicating whether a firm shifted tax 
regimes in 2012. 
It also seems necessary to control for the level of productivity. The data 
set does not provide a direct measurement of productivity but provides infor-
mation on the level of schooling attained by employees, and this may be related 
to skills and productive technology employed by the firm. Lau et al. (1991) say 
that education allows a person to learn and perform tasks and to adopt new 
technologies as a complementary input to physical capital (Lau et al. 1991: 2, 
Rumberger 1987). So, assuming that productivity is correlated with higher edu-
cation, the share of workers with a medium level of schooling or higher is in-
cluded as a control variable. 
6.2 Model specification 
Following Wooldridge (Wooldridge 2013: 466-467) and Khandker (2010: 
74) the effects of the tax policy may be evaluated by using a regression model 
specified as:  
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𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛿0𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑔𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡        𝑡 = 0, 1 
where Yit are the outcome variables, the number of employment contracts dur-
ing the year, the annual number of working hours, and the average hourly wage 
in Brazilian Reais, for the firm i at the time t. Tt is a dummy variable for time, 
equal to 1 for 2012. The term treatedit refers to exposure to the treatment, as-
suming a value of 1 if firm i is non-Simples in time-period 1. The estimate of β1 
indicates the effect of the tax reform on the outcome variables. The coefficient 
β2 will capture the variation in the outcome if the firm shifts tax regimes across 
time from Simples (0) to non-Simples (1) or vice versa. The term Xit represents 
time-varying control variables which will be the share of the workforce with an 
education level equal or above the intermediary level and regional dummy vari-
ables. The term ai is a firm fixed effect that controls for all time-invariant ob-
servable and unobservable characteristics.  
Some authors point out possible differences in the effects of a payroll tax 
on groups of workers (Gruber 1997, Hamermesh 1979, Kugler and Kugler 
2008). For instance, effects on employment and/or wages may be stronger for 
production workers compared to administrative staff, or for young workers 
and women in comparison with adult male workers. The study will further ex-
amine this possibility, observing whether the tax reform changed the labour 
force composition of firms measured by the share of production workers in 
the total number of employees or the share of adult male workers. If, for in-
stance, the share of production workers increases for firms exposed to the pol-
icy, this will show that the reform increased the demand for these workers in 
comparison to administrative personnel. The same applies for the gender/age 
variable.  
This approach will be implemented first by an OLS regression that will 
produce biased results by the omission of unobserved variables, even if it con-
trols for sector and region. Subsequently, in order to avoid this bias the policy’s 
impacts will be estimated by difference-in-differences. A non-parametric esti-
mation of differences-in-differences will indicate the changes in averages for 
the outcome variables across groups and time. Finally, a regression framework 
of the fixed effects model will be performed to estimate the policy effects for 
the main sample. The same procedure will be performed for each sector and 
also for an enlarged sample including firms of all sizes. 
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Chapter 7  
Data 
The data source for this research is the RAIS which is an administrative record 
held by the Ministry of Labour with data about formal employment contracts 
in the country. The data are provided annually by employers and contain in-
formation about the firm (size, location, sector, tax regime, nature of capital), 
employment conditions (contractual wage, contractual working hours, and type 
of contract), and personal characteristics of the employees (age, gender, 
schooling). RAIS is regarded as a highly reliable data base and has been exten-
sively used in studies about the Brazilian labour market (Dallava 2014, FGV 
Projetos 2013).  
A panel data set of existing firms in 2010, 2011 and 2012, identified by 
their code number at the National Registry of Juridical Persons (CNPJ) was 
provided under the agreement between the Ministry of Labour and DIEESE. 
The use of the data set was conditional on the confidential use of the infor-
mation on individual firms and employees.  
The variables from RAIS used in the study are: 
a. Identification variable of the firm; 
b. Year; 
c. Economic sector according to CNAE at two, three or five-digit level; 
d. Region where the firm is located (South, Southeast, Northeast, North 
or Centre-West); 
e. Dummy for firms not under the Simples = 1; 
f. Total number of employment contracts; 
g. Proportion of employees in production occupations, i.e. those in 
groups 3, 5-9 of the Brazilian Occupational Classification (CBO) – (see 
Appendix 3); 
h. Proportion of employees with schooling level equal to or above the in-
termediary level; 
i. Proportion of male workers; 
j. Proportion of young workers, that is those aged 24 years or less;  
k. Proportion male employees aged above than 24 years; 
l. Contractual hours of work; and 
m. Hourly wage. 
As this study is concerned with the effects of the policy on the demand 
for labour, we use information at the individual level to generate a data set that 
can be used for the analysis of changes at the firm level. This was done by ag-
gregating the information on employment contracts in a particular firm identi-
fied by the CNPJ number in the original data set.  
The first step in setting up the database was the selection of the sectors 
covered by the payroll tax change in January 2012. This was done by matching 
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manufactured products covered by the tax change with the corresponding in-
dustrial sectors based on the comparative table published by Zanghelini et al. 
(2013).  
Following, employment contracts with annual average remuneration equal 
to zero were dropped from the sample as no effective work was performed 
during the year under study. These employment contracts correspond in most 
cases to workers on long term health leave, so they were probably replaced by 
another worker. Thus, if these contracts were not excluded from the sample 
there would be a double counting of same job positions. In 2011 there were 
69,980 contracts with no wage out of a total of 3,592,324 jobs, and in 2012 the 
number of contracts was 75,019 out of 3,699,156. 
In order to obtain a more precise measure of labour input than the simple 
number of employees, the duration of each employment contract was calculat-
ed even if shorter than twelve months. In 2011, around 60 percent of the em-
ployment contracts were shorter than 12 months. The alternative option of 
using contracts valid on 31st of December would neglect employee turnover 
and thus might result in biased estimates of variance in total employment 
across time. 
In addition, the measure of the total labour input considers the working 
hours for each employee calculated by the contractual weekly working hours 
multiplied by 4.33 weeks per month. Even though the data set contains infor-
mation on the overtime performed it may not reflect informal arrangements 
between employers and workers, thus is not used in this study.  
With the employment duration in months and the contractual hours of 
work it was possible to calculate the total hours of work performed by each 
worker in the year. The resulting figure seems to measure labour input better 
than the absolute number of employees, as it takes into account the number, 
duration and intensity (working hours) of employment contracts. Similarly, 
multiplying the average monthly wage per job by its duration in months result-
ed in a figure for annual earnings. Dividing this result by the contractual work-
ing hours produced the hourly wage. 
The data set does not contain information about the level of labour skills. 
Level of schooling attained is however available and may be taken as a proxy 
for skills. Considering that technical training requires at least an intermediate 
level of education, a dummy variable was generated to indicate the proportion 
of employees that had completed this level of education.  
Information on age and sex are used to generate variables for the share of 
young workers - 24 years of age or under – and the share of male workers in 
the workforce. A combination of sex and adulthood is used to calculate the 
share of employees that may be considered part of the so called ‘primary’ 
workforce: adult male workers.  
Another point of interest is whether possible effects on employment will 
be felt in production or in administrative jobs. Therefore, an additional dummy 
variable was generated to aggregate the occupations that can be more directly 
related to productive activities, comprising employment contracts falling under 
Groups 3 and 5-9 of the CBO (Appendix 3). 
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At this point in the process, the identification variable of the firm (CNPJ) 
was used to produce the number of employees per year, the total number of 
contracted hours of work, and the annual wage bill per firm. Dividing the an-
nual wage bill by the total number of hours of work resulted in an average 
hourly wage. Averages on dummy variables produced the proportion of 
male/female workers, the share of workers with an education level above the 
intermediate, and other characteristics. 
The main explanatory variable is treatment, which is an interaction term 
between the binary variable for the tax regime non-Simples (equal to 1) and 
time 1, i.e. the year 2012. It was seen that 3,628 firms switched from Simples in 
2011 to non-Simples in 2012, whereas 2,285 firms switched in the other direc-
tion, influencing 7 percent of the sample and increasing by 1,343 the number 
of non-Simples firms. A dummy variable was generated to indicate whether a 
firm shifted between tax regimes.  
7.1 Descriptive statistics 
This study is based on a sample of firms that operated in one of the four sec-
tors covered by the payroll tax reform. Excluding a total of 237 firms that ex-
isted in 2011 or 2012 and that had employment contracts in more than one 
sector, region, or tax regime, there are 99,393 firms for 2011 and 101,070 firms 
for 2012. To obtain a balanced panel of existing firms in both years, firms that 
entered or left the market in 2012 were excluded, leaving 83,805 firms in the 
panel (Table 4).  
TABLE 4 
Evolution in the number of firms – 
selected sectors – 2011-12 - Brazil 
Source: MTE - RAIS 2011-2012 
 
The distribution of firms and employment in 2011 based on firm size sug-
gests that most are small and medium (Figure 3). The majority of firms had less 
than 10 employees in 2011 whereas firms with more than 50 employees repre-
sent around 11 percent of the total sample and less than 8 percent for the Sim-
ples group.   
 Full sample 
Non-
SIMPLES 
SIMPLES 
FIRMS EXISTING IN 2011 99,393 24,064 75,329 
Exit of firms in 2011 -15,588 -4,311 -11,277 
Entry of firms in 2012 17,265 4,437 12,828 
Shifts in tax regime (net) - 1,343 -1,343 
FIRMS IN 2012 101,070 25,533 75,537 
EXISTING FIRMS IN BOTH YEARS 83,805 21,096 62,709 
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As for the distribution of employment based on firm size (Figure 4), the 
difference between the two groups is sharper. Almost two thirds of employ-
ment contracts were held by firms with 100 or more employees and even 
among Simples firms, most jobs were provided by larger firms. Notwithstand-
ing, smaller firms seem to be more important for job creation in the Simples 
group when compared with the non-Simples group. 
FIGURE 3 
Share of firms by number of employees – Selected sectors –  
Brazil – 2011 - % 
 
Source: MTE - RAIS 2011 
FIGURE 4 
Share of employment by number of employees - Selected sectors –  
Brazil – 2011 - % 
 
Source: MTE - RAIS 2011 
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The figures above show that, compared to the control group, the treated 
firms are larger and exhibit other characteristics that suggest differences in 
technology and capital. Some of these differences may be related to the eco-
nomic sector but not all.  
In order to deal with heterogeneity among firms in the same sector this 
study estimates the effects across firms of same size. Given the lack of data on 
revenue, assets, or machinery, the number of employees at the baseline is taken 
as a measure of the firm’s size.  
Thus, the analysis will focus primarily on a sub-set of 74,376 firms that in 
2011 had less than 50 employees at the baseline, representing 89 percent of 
existing firms and 23 percent of employment. Among non-Simples firms, 79 
percent fall under the cut off (7.4 percent of employment in this group), and 
92 percent among Simples firms (55 percent of the jobs in these firms). After 
this cut off, it was observed that six firms increased the number of employees 
to more than 500 in 2012. These firms were considered outliers and trimmed 
off the sample.  Figure 5 helps to see that the resulting sample is composed of 
firms with a similar distribution based on number of employees.  
FIGURE 5 
Percentage of firms by number of employees - firms with less 
than 50 employees - Selected sectors – Brazil – 2011 - % 
 
Source: MTE - RAIS 2011 
 
Distribution of firms across sectors shows the garment industry to be the 
largest in terms of number of firms (57 percent) and employment (58 percent). 
Conversely, the textile sector is the smallest sector in terms of both number of 
firms and employment. The leather and shoes industry has the highest average 
number of employees per firm (12.3). The shares of firms and jobs in the ser-
vice sector within the size range are substantial, but the average number of 
employees per firm is the smallest (8.5 workers).  
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TABLE 5 
Number of firms and average number of employees by sector -  
firms with less than 50 employees – selected sectors – Brazil - 2011 
 
Source: MTE - RAIS 2011 
The share of non-Simples firms was nearly 1/5 of the total, ranging from 
14.5 percent in the garment industry to 40 percent in the service sector (Table 
6). Thus, the labour tax reform roughly covered one in every five firms operat-
ing in those manufacturing and service sectors, but was more relevant for the 
service sector.  
TABLE 6 
Number of firms by sector and tax regime – selected sectors - 
firms with less than 50 employees – Brazil - 2011 
 
Source: MTE - RAIS 2011 
During the period under consideration 5,374 firms shifted between tax re-
gimes, 3,231 shifting from Simples to non-Simples, and 2,145 in the other di-
rection. Therefore, the number of non-Simples firms after the policy was im-
plemented was 7 percent greater than one year before.  
Descriptive statistics at the baseline (Table 7) show that the average num-
ber of employees in treatment firms is 5.9 percent greater than in the control 
firms with a larger difference in the average number of working hours: 8.62 
percent. These discrepancies may indicate that employment spells are shorter 
in Simples firms and turnover is faster. Treated firms have a smaller share of 
employees working directly in the production process than firms in the control 
Sector
Average 
number of 
employees
Stand. 
Dev.
Textile 7,492 10.0% 81,588 10.5% 10.89 11.10
Garment 42,350 56.7% 450,406 57.8% 10.64 10.79
Leather & shoes 9,334 12.5% 114,749 14.7% 12.29 11.88
Services 15,560 20.8% 132,629 17.0% 8.52 9.66
TOTAL 74,736 100.0% 779,372 100.0% 10.43 10.80
FIRMS
Total number of 
employees
Economic sector TOTAL
Textile 1,623 21.70% 5,869 78.30% 7,492
Garment 6,133 14.50% 36,217 85.50% 42,350
Leather & shoes 1,693 18.10% 7,641 81.90% 9,334
Services 6,189 39.80% 9,371 60.20% 15,560
TOTAL 15,638 20.90% 59,098 79.10% 74,736
non-SIMPLES SIMPLES
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group. A much more striking distinction can be seen in the average hourly 
wage which is 62 percent higher in the treatment group than in the control 
group7. 
TABLE 7 
Descriptive statistics - Selected sectors –  
firms with less than 50 employees – Brazil – 2011 - % 
 
Some of these distinctions between groups can be related to individual 
characteristics of the employees such as the higher proportions of male and 
adult workers, and of workers with an education level equal to or higher than 
intermediary in the treatment group. There are also regional and sectoral dis-
tinctions between both groups. Treated firms seem to be more concentrated in 
                                                 
7 As a comparison, hourly minimum wage was BR$ 2.86 in 2011 and BR$ 3.26 in 2012 
per hour (for 44 working hours/week and 4.33 weeks/month). 
Variable 
TREATMENT GROUP  CONTROL GROUP 
Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 
     
Average number of jobs 10.90 11.66 
 
10.29 10.53 
Employment in production 0.67 0.35 
 
0.76 0.32 
Average hours of work per firm 17,044 18,872 
 
15,692 16,688 
Average hourly wage (BR$) 7.71 9.73 
 
4.76 2.74 
EMPLOYEES’ CHARACTERISTICS     
Sex (male =1) 0.47 0.35 
 
0.34 0.34 
Average age (years) 33.54 7.98 
 
33.45 7.72 
Share of employees w/ medium level 
of schooling  0.66 0.37 
 
0.56 0.37 
Share of employees age< 25  0.24 0.27 
 
0.27 0.27 
Share of adult male employees 0.34 0.31 
 
0.22 0.28 
REGION     
North 0.01 0.10 
 
0.01 0.10 
Northeast 0.10 0.30 
 
0.14 0.34 
Southeast 0.64 0.48 
 
0.47 0.50 
South 0.21 0.40 
 
0.31 0.46 
Centre-west 0.05 0.22 
 
0.08 0.26 
SECTOR      
Textile 0.10 0.30 
 
0.10 0.30 
Garment 0.41 0.49 
 
0.61 0.49 
Leather and shoes 0.11 0.31 
 
0.13 0.34 
Service sectors 0.38 0.49 
 
0.16 0.37 
      
NUMBER OF FIRMS 16,724 
  
58,012 
 
NUMBER OF JOBS 182,316 
  
597,056 
 
Source: MTE/RAIS 2011 
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the industrialized Southeast region. In contrast, non-treated firms are distribut-
ed more evenly and with higher prevalence in the Northeast, South, and Cen-
tre-West regions. The garment and service sectors are the most represented in 
both groups, but for treated firms the proportion of firms in the latter sector is 
larger than in the former. 
These differences between treatment and control groups8 do not neces-
sarily affect negatively the empirical strategy chosen, as it looks at how each of 
those groups performs over time. 
                                                 
8 An independent t-test performed on the sample, not reported, suggested that differ-
ences in means are significantly different from zero at 95 percent of confidence inter-
val, except for the average age and for the share of firms in the North region. 
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Chapter 8  
Results 
If one examines how employment performed in industries covered by the pay-
roll tax reform in 2012, at first glance the impression is that the policy did not 
have strong positive effects. As shown in Section 2.4, formal employment lev-
els in covered sectors increased by only 0.6 percent in relation to the previous 
year. Even when limiting the observation to firms existed in both 2011 and 
2012, firms that were supposed to perform better despite the more adverse 
economic environment that characterized the period, employment increased by 
less than 2 percent in 2012. The empirical strategy proposed in this paper in-
tends to identify the effects of the payroll tax reform, isolating it from other 
factors that interfered in the performance of the labour market for the covered 
sectors.      
Given that the empirical strategy relies on the parallel trend assumption, 
the first section is dedicated to examining whether this assumption holds. Then 
the analysis will focus on firms with less than 50 employees in 2011, both for 
the aggregated sectors and for each of them individually. After that, the analy-
sis will present estimates of the policy effects on firms of all sizes. 
8.1 Examining the parallel trend 
The empirical approach taken in this analysis assumed that unobserved 
heterogeneity coming from sector and region factors do not vary with time. 
The analysis rests on the critical parallel trend assumption, meaning that unob-
served error term is not correlated with the outcomes (Khandker 2010: 73).  
One way to check whether this assumption holds is to observe how varia-
bles trend for treatment and control groups in a period of time before the 
treatment. However, as the firm is the observational unit and a number of 
firms enter and leave the market every year, it is impossible to follow the same 
group of firms across several years. To circumvent this problem a group of 
60,066 firms that existed in 2010, 2011 and 2012, plus another 11,156 firms 
that existed in 2010 and in 2011 but not in 2012 will be examined. The latter 
group of firms are assigned to control or treatment groups according to their 
tax regime (Simples or not) despite the fact that they did not exist in 2012.  
Observing the outcome variables for these 71,222 firms, split into treat-
ment and control, we see that from 2010 to 2011 employment did not trend 
similarly for both groups, falling 4.9 percent in treated firms and 1.8 percent in 
the control group (Figure 6). As for the labour input measured by average 
hours of work, trends were opposite, with a 3 percent drop in the treatment 
group and a 1 percent increase in the control group (Figure 7). Differences in 
trends are significant, even though they might be considered small (3 and 4 
percentage points respectively). 
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FIGURE 6 
Average employment in treatment and control groups - Selected sectors 
– Firms with less than 50 employees in 2011 - Brazil – 2010-2012 
 
Source: MTE – RAIS 2010-2012 
FIGURE 7 
Contracted working hours in treatment and control groups –  
Selected sectors - Firms with less than 50 employees in 2011 – Brazil 
(hours/year per firm) – 2010-2012  
 
Source: MTE – RAIS 2010-2012 
The average hourly wage trends similarly for both groups of firms over 
time (Figure 7). Wages increase 6.5 percent in treated firms in 2011 and 6.3 
percent in untreated. The pay rise seems to be stronger in 2012 compared to 
the previous year, but the sample for 2012 is smaller in both groups.  
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FIGURE 8 
Average hourly wage in treatment and control groups –  
Selected sectors - Firms with less than 50 employees in 2011 –  
Brazil – 2010-2012 
  
Source: MTE – RAIS 2010-2012 
As an additional check, a placebo regression was performed, regressing the 
outcome variables on the tax regime using data from 2010 and 2011. The non-
Simples firms in 2011 were assigned to the treatment group as if exposed to a 
pretend tax reduction that year. Confirming the previous discussion, the coef-
ficients obtained were statistically significant but small and negative for em-
ployment and hours of work, and positive for wage (see Appendix 4). These 
coefficients suggest that compared to Simples firms, and controlling for other 
factors, average employment in non-Simples firms fell by 0.435 (-3.4 percent in 
relation to the baseline in Figure 6), average hours decreased by -770.0 (-3.8 
percent, compared with Figure 7), whereas wages rose by 0.174 (2.5 percent; in 
relation to Figure 8).  
Examining only the sample of 60,066 firms that existed for all of the three 
years, trends in employment and hours of work in 2010-2011 became more 
differentiated between treatment and control groups, while wages still per-
formed similarly (see Appendix 5). Hence, the potential downward bias tends 
to increase, though this evidence is weakened by the smaller number of firms 
in this sample. 
The evidence above shows that the treatment group was performing a lit-
tle worse than the control group before the policy, while wages were growing 
more in the former group. If these trends were the consequence of factors that 
remained after the policy implementation, then they would attenuate the ex-
pected positive employment effects of the policy and amplify a potential partial 
effect on wages. In other words, if there are biases in the estimates of the poli-
cy effects, they might be downwards for employment and hours of work, and 
upwards for hourly wages.  
2010 2011 2012
treatment 6.95 7.41 8.22
control 4.45 4.73 5.17
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
treatment
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8.2 Effects on employment and wages for firms with 
less than 50 employees 
This section presents estimates of the policy effects for a sample of existing 
firms in 2011 and in 2012, limited by size. Estimates from a pooled OLS re-
gression are presented first, but these results are naïve and biased by omitted 
variables. Second, results of the difference-in-differences approach are report-
ed. This approach includes time invariant unobservables and is implemented 
by a non-parametric estimation and by a firm fixed effects model.  
 Estimates obtained from a pooled OLS regression (Table 8) suggest that 
the change in payroll tax, controlling for the shift in tax regime and for the lev-
el of workers’ education, increases employment by 2.654 employees, which is 
quite substantial given the average of 10.4 employees at the baseline. Treat-
ment is also positively correlated to the number of total working hours: the 
estimated effect is a noticeable 3,652 hours per year (23 percent of the average 
at the baseline). The mean hourly wage increases by BR$ 3.08, almost 60 per-
cent in relation to the period before treatment. All these three estimates are 
statistically significant.  
The coefficient for the time variable is estimated positive for employment 
and hours of work, but negative for hourly wage. In addition, the share of 
skilled workforce is negatively correlated with employment and hours of work, 
suggesting that productivity increases with the level of skills, and wages go up. 
The negative sign of the coefficient associated to the shift in tax regime may be 
interpreted as a downward effect on the averages in the treatment group (non-
Simples) whenever a Simples firm shifts into it. Simples firms are smaller, so 
when they enter the non-Simples group they end up reducing the averages for 
that group.  
Using the garment industry as the base category, a second specification 
that includes sectors as additional covariates results in larger estimates for the 
treatment. The positive coefficients for the textile and leather and shoes indus-
tries indicate that the effects on employment and hours of work are more sub-
stantial than for the base category. Accordingly, the effects on the service sec-
tors are smaller. There seems to be a higher wage increase in all these three 
sectors, as compared to the base category. 
However, these estimates may be considered naïve. They are biased by the 
fact that treated firms, on average, hire more employees and tend to pay higher 
salaries than non-treated firms. These pooled OLS estimates are misleading as 
a number of factors that may affect the tax regime in which a firm lies and the 
outcomes are not controlled for.  
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TABLE 8 
OLS estimation of the effect of a reduction of contributions to  
Social Security on employment, hours of work and hourly wage – 
 Selected sectors – Firms with less than 50 employees in 2011 – Brazil 
 
 
A non-parametric double-difference estimate is thus more useful. It sug-
gests that firms exposed to the tax change performed better in relation to em-
ployment levels and labour input than those not exposed. After the policy was 
implemented, the treatment group employed 13.8 percent more workers than 
the control group, and contracted 8.0 percent more hours of work (Table 9). 
However, when it comes to wages, the average wage per hour increased slightly 
more in non-treated firms than among the treatment group (-0.9 percent). For 
the share of adult male workers and for the composition of production or ad-
ministrative workers, there were not substantial differences between groups.  
 Average employment Average hours of work Average hourly wages 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Time 0.213*** 0.138* 536.7*** 400.4*** -0.210*** -0.0338 
 (0.0710) (0.0710) (105.2) (105.1) (0.0285) (0.0274) 
Treatment 2.654*** 2.947*** 3,652*** 4,200*** 3.084*** 2.340*** 
 (0.116) (0.117) (172.1) (173.7) (0.0466) (0.0453) 
Switch of tax 
regime 
-1.715*** -1.818*** -2,687*** -2,877*** -1.423*** -1.160*** 
(0.187) (0.187) (276.8) (276.3) (0.0749) (0.0721) 
Share of workers 
with intermediary 
schooling or + 
-2.059*** -1.098*** -3,763*** -2,189*** 2.482*** 0.833*** 
(0.0884) (0.0970) (131.0) (143.8) (0.0355) (0.0375) 
Textile  0.252**  463.8***  0.500*** 
  (0.113)  (167.5)  (0.0437) 
Leather & shoes  1.940***  1,983***  0.193*** 
  (0.104)  (153.5)  (0.0401) 
Services  -1.494***  -2,858***  3.925*** 
  (0.0924)  (136.9)  (0.0357) 
Constant 11.62*** 11.11*** 18,176*** 17,565*** 3.982*** 4.046*** 
 (0.0694) (0.0747) (102.7) (110.7) (0.0278) (0.0289) 
       
Observations 149,472 149,472 149,472 149,472 149,472 149,472 
R-squared 0.007 0.012 0.009 0.014 0.064 0.136 
Note: dependent variables in levels. Treatment is a dummy variable for firms not 
under the Simples regime in 2012. Switch of tax regime is a dummy = 1 if a firm shifted the 
tax regime from 2011 to 2012. For regional dummies, garment industry is the base 
category. Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 9 
Double difference estimation of employment, hours of work,  
hourly wage, labour force composition – Selected sectors –  
2011/12 – Brazil  
 
Using a firm Fixed Effects model to estimate the effects of the payroll tax 
reduction on firms in all four sectors, the results are significant and coefficients 
are large for the main outcome variables (Table 10)9. These results suggest that 
firms covered by the labour tax policy increased their total employment by 
1.567 jobs on average, which represents a 14.4 percent increase in relation to 
the baseline (10.90 jobs; see Table 9).  
Coefficients for total hours of work are also statistically significant and 
suggest that the policy expanded the amount of labour input by 1,500 hours on 
average, representing an 8.8 percent increase. This percentage is higher than 
the positive variation, also statistically significant, in the average hourly wage of 
BR$ 0.17, or 2.1 percent in relation to the baseline. 
                                                 
9 Hausman test, not reported, was performed to check whether Fixed Effects or Ran-
dom Effects produced consistent and unbiased estimates for each specification. The 
null hypotheses were rejected in all cases, indicating that the FE model produces con-
sistent and unbiased estimates.  
VARIABLE 2011 2012 Difference % 
     AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT 
   Treatment 10.90 12.77 1.87 17.1% 
Control 10.29 10.59 0.30 2.9% 
Difference 0.61 2.18 1.57 13.8% 
     AVERAGE HOURS OF WORK 
  Treatment 17,044 19,306 2,262 13.3%
Control 15,692 16,451 759 4.8% 
Difference 1,351 2,855 1,503 8.0% 
     AVERAGE HOURLY WAGE 
   Treatment 7.71 8.26 0.55 7.1%
Control 4.76 5.15 0.38 8.1% 
Difference 2.95 3.11 0.16 -0.9% 
     SHARE OF PRODUCTION WORKERS 
  Treatment 0.67 0.67 0.00 -0.6%
Control 0.76 0.76 -0.01 -0.7% 
Difference -0.09 -0.09 0.00 0.1% 
     SHARE OF ADULT MALE WORKERS 
  Treatment 0.34 0.35 0.01 3.2%
Control 0.22 0.23 0.01 3.9% 
Difference 0.11 0.12 0.00 -0.7% 
Source: MTE/RAIS 2011-2012. 
42 
 
TABLE 10 
Estimates of effects of reduction in Social Security contribution on 
employment, hours of work and hourly wage using Fixed Effects – 
Selected sector – Firms with less than 50 employees in 2011 -  
Brazil – 2011/12 
 
 
The second specification reported in Table 10 includes a dummy variable 
for shifts in the tax regime and the share of workers with at least an intermedi-
ate education level. Larger and statistically significant coefficients for the main 
explanatory variable suggest that the effect of the payroll tax reduction is 
stronger when controlled for other intervening factors. The effect of treatment 
is estimated, on average, at 1.698 more employees (15.6 percent increase), 
1,633 more hours of work (9.6 percent), and a BR$ 0.18 (2.4 percent) wage in-
crease. The coefficient relative to the shifting of the tax regime is significantly 
different from zero and suggests that switching firms decreases mean employ-
ment, the average hours of work and the average wage. A possible explanation 
is that these firms are typically smaller and reduce the outcome averages.  
As for the educational level of workers, as it rises it seems to decrease the 
employment and labour input, and increase wages. These findings are intuitive 
based on the relation between schooling, productivity, and wages. 
 
Average 
employment 
Average hours of 
work 
Average hourly 
wage 
Share 
of prod. 
workers 
Share 
of adult 
male 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Time 
0.314*** 0.345*** 778.5*** 809.8*** 0.378*** 0.382*** -0.004*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.0429) (0.0432) (55.28) (55.74) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.001) (0.001) 
Treatment 
1.567*** 1.698*** 1,500*** 1,633*** 0.165*** 0.183*** 0.001 0.003* 
 
(0.0904) (0.0934) (116.5) (120.4) (0.0266) (0.0275) (0.001) (0.002) 
Switch of tax 
regime 
 -0.834***  -849.0***  -0.116*** -0.003 -0.005** 
 (0.151)  (194.1)  (0.0443) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share of 
workers with 
intermediary 
schooling or + 
-0.963*** -0.961*** -1,094*** -1,092*** 0.330*** 0.331*** -0.088*** 0.0107*** 
(0.192) (0.192) (247.5) (247.5) (0.0565) (0.0565) (0.003) (0.00314) 
Constant 
10.99*** 10.99*** 16,629*** 16,628*** 5.229*** 5.229*** 0.792*** 0.242*** 
 
(0.114) (0.114) (147.6) (147.5) (0.0337) (0.0337) (0.002) (0.00187) 
 
        
Observations 
149,472 149,472 149,472 149,472 149,472 149,472 149,472 149,472 
R-squared 
0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.020 0.020 0.012 0.003 
N. of firms 
74,736 74,736 74,736 74,736 74,736 74,736 74,736 74,736 
Note: dependent variables in levels. Treatment is a dummy variable for firms not 
under the Simples regime in 2012. Switch of tax regime is a dummy = 1 if a firm shifted the 
tax regime from 2011 to 2012. Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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The last two columns in Table 10 show that treatment did not significantly 
affect the share of production workers and produced a small increase of 0.3 
percentage points in the share of adult male workers.   
To check the robustness of these estimates, the same model was estimated 
excluding textile firms from the sample. Results for the treatment variable in-
creases employment by 1.752 (16.5 percent of the baseline), in hours of work 
by 1,748 (10.6 percent variation), and in wages specification by BR$ 0.189 (2.4 
percent increase) (Appendix 6). Thus, it is possible to say that, ceteris paribus, the 
longer the firm was covered, the stronger the policy effect. 
A second check was performed to verify whether firms already anticipated 
employment decisions in 2011, once the policy was announced, by including 
another round of data for 2010 for firms that also existed in 2012. Controlling 
for the switch in tax regime and educational level of workers, the coefficients 
for the treatment became smaller, but still positive and significant: 1.166 more 
employees, 762 more hours of work and a BR$ 0.26 increase in the average 
wage (see Appendix 7). Instead of increasing by the inclusion of another round 
of data, the coefficients decrease, suggesting that the impact is stronger when a 
comparison is made between 2011 and 2012, thus not anticipated. The smaller 
coefficients may be explained by the worse performance from 2010 to 2011 of 
potentially treated firms when compared to the control group. 
In summary, the difference-in-differences with firm Fixed Effects ap-
proach results in positive, significant, and large estimates of the effects of the 
payroll tax reduction on employment. For firms covered by the policy, the pay-
roll tax reduction of 20 percent of the wage bill resulted in 14-16 percent more 
formal jobs and a 9-10 percent increase in working hours, on average. Fur-
thermore, there was a 2 percent average partial shift of the tax benefit. The 
next section presents sector-specific estimates. 
8.3 Results by economic sector 
Examining the policy effects by economic sector, results are presented in Table 
11 (for full estimates, see Appendix 8). The second column contains the means 
at the baseline (2011), the third column shows the coefficients for the treat-
ment effect on the outcome variables, and the fourth column presents the ef-
fects in percentages of variation.  
These results indicate that in all four sectors employment and average con-
tractual hours of work increased in treated firms substantially more than in 
non-treated firms. However, the largest effects are seen in the leather and 
shoes industry, with a more than 35 percent increase in employment, 24 per-
cent increase in working hours, and a larger rise in wages. In the other three 
sectors the coefficients suggest that employment expanded by around 8-13 
percent, and labour input from 3 to 6 percent.  
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TABLE 11 
Fixed Effects estimates of effects of reduction in Social Security 
contribution on employment, hours of work and hourly wage by 
economic sector – firms with less than 50 employees in 2011 -  
Brazil – 2011/12 
 
 
The data do not offer enough information to explain this differentiation in 
employment and working hours among sectors. However, it is worth noting 
that the leather and shoes industry may be more export-oriented than the other 
sectors (ABDI 2008: 184-185, Lemos et al. 2008: 6, Nascimento 2007). This 
seems to support the hypothesis that the greater reduction in the tax burden 
for exporting firms enhanced their competitiveness, and expanded their de-
mand for labour. 
As for the wage specification, the results seem to be more homogeneous 
across sectors. Only in the garment industry is the coefficient for treatment in 
the wage specification not significantly different from zero, even at a 10 per-
cent confidence level. The reason for this may be that where wages in treated 
firms were closer to the minimum wage, like in the garment industry, its in-
crease in 2012 may have equally influenced wages paid in treatment and con-
trol groups alike, thus reducing the effect of the treatment. 
8.4 Estimating effects for firms of all sizes 
The analysis so far has compared firms within a range of sizes to reduce heter-
ogeneity between the treatment and control groups. However, it is worth 
checking whether these estimates are sensitive to firm size when the size re-
striction is raised. This is done by estimating the Fixed Effect model on a sam-
ple of firms of all sizes. 
Dependent variable: Average employment Mean value at baseline Treatment % change 
Garment 10.66 1.35*** 12.7% 
Textile 13.10 1.23*** 9.4% 
Leather and shoes 13.44 4.71*** 35.4% 
Services 9.83 0.82*** 8.3% 
 
   Dependent variable: Contracted working hours Mean value at baseline Treatment % change 
Garment 17,135 949.4*** 5.5% 
Textile 21,331 656.6** 3.1% 
Leather and shoes 20,808 5,067.0*** 24.35% 
Services 14,709 935.5*** 6.4% 
 
   Dependent variable: Average hourly wage Mean value at baseline Treatment % change 
Garment 4.93 0.035 0.7% 
Textile 5.82 0.133** 2.3% 
Leather and shoes 5.06 0.131*** 2.6% 
Services 11.95 0.277*** 2.3% 
Note: for the estimates results, see Appendix 8. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The results from this estimation procedure are also positive and signifi-
cant, though less strong (Table 12). Looking at average employment and total 
hours of work, the variations suggest that firms exposed to the tax change de-
manded more labour than those firms not exposed. In the specification that 
includes as covariates the dummy for shifts in tax regime and the share of 
workers with a higher education, the treated firms seem to have hired 4.6 per-
cent more workers (4.596 jobs in relation to 108.75 jobs at the baseline – see 
Appendix 9) as a result of the treatment and 2.1 percent more hours of work 
were contracted (3,257 hours on top of the 154,496 hours at the baseline). 
Wages also went up, on average by 3.4 percent (BR$ 0.27 cents on top of BR$ 
7.93 at the baseline for the treated firms). 
TABLE 12 
Fixed Effects estimates of effects of reduction in Social Security 
contribution on employment, hours of work and hourly wage –  
Selected sectors – Brazil – 2011/12 
 
 
It is worth noting that switching tax regimes has negative effects signifi-
cantly different from zero only for employment and hourly wages. As com-
mented above, it is likely that firms that switch tax regime are smaller and thus 
reduce the average for the non-Simples group. The share of employees with 
VARIABLES 
Average employment 
Contracted working 
hours 
Average hourly wage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Time -0.319 -0.219 -28.48 37.43 0.388*** 0.393*** 
 (0.418) (0.421) (461.1) (464.7) (0.0118) (0.0119) 
Treatment 4.596*** 4.969*** 3,011*** 3,257*** 0.245*** 0.267*** 
 (0.830) (0.853) (915.9) (941.1) (0.0234) (0.0241) 
Switch of tax 
regime 
 -2.747*  -1,812  -0.160*** 
 (1.446)  (1,595)  (0.0408) 
Share of 
workers with 
intermediary 
schooling or + 
-2.746 -2.736 -3,087 -3,080 0.346*** 0.347*** 
(1.911) (1.911) (2,109) (2,109) (0.0539) (0.0539) 
Constant 41.68*** 41.67*** 59,763*** 59,759*** 5.346*** 5.346*** 
 (1.127) (1.127) (1,243) (1,243) (0.0318) (0.0318) 
       
Observations 167,610 167,610 167,610 167,610 167,610 167,610 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.025 
Number of 
firms 
83,805 83,805 83,805 83,805 83,805 83,805 
Note: dependent variables in levels. Treatment is a dummy variable for firms not 
under the Simples regime in 2012. Switch of tax regime is a dummy = 1 if a firm shifted the 
tax regime from 2011 to 2012. Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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higher than intermediary level schooling is positive and significant for the wage 
specification. This may be interpreted as having an effect on the level of 
productivity and employees’ compensation. 
These results suggest that even when the comparison is made between 
more heterogeneous groups, the payroll tax reform was followed by an in-
crease, though small, in employment, and labour demand, and a larger effect 
on wages in the treated group. It is possible that because the labour tax law was 
initially only valid until December 2014, it may have had a limited effect on 
long term investments to increase employment levels. If this problem is more 
frequent among larger firms, then this might explain why the policy effects on 
employment are weaker among this group. It is also worth noting that the 
counterfactual in this estimation is less credible as sharper differences in sizes 
may imply time variant factors affecting differently firms in the treatment and 
control groups. 
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Chapter 9  
Conclusion 
This study attempted to estimate the effect of a change in labour taxation in 
Brazil on employment and wages. Starting in January 2012, firms not under the 
special tax regime for small and micro enterprises (Simples) that operated in 
four economic sectors experienced a cut in the employers’ contribution to so-
cial security of 20 percent of the wage bill. Relying on administrative data that 
allowed for a firm level analysis, the study explored information on the tax re-
gime to build a potentially credible counterfactual necessary for the measure-
ment of the policy effects.  
The main results suggest that treated firms increased the number of for-
mal employment contracts by 14-16 percent, total working hours by 8-10 per-
cent, and wages by 2-2.3 percent, in relation to untreated firms in the same sec-
tor and size range. These figures indicate that the payroll tax reduction resulted 
in employment generation, increase in labour demand, and in a small increase 
in wages in its first year of implementation.  
These estimates are statistically significant in almost all specifications. 
They seem robust to the exclusion of the textile sector, which was only cov-
ered later, as the effects become stronger if the analysis is limited to firms in 
the sectors covered earlier. The study also confirmed that employment and la-
bour demand were not anticipated by firms in 2011, as the bulk of the policy 
effects seem to have happened after the policy adoption. Besides, weaker ef-
fects on employment and labour input were found when larger firms are in-
cluded in the analysis.  
When the analysis is disaggregated by sector, the largest coefficients of 
variation in employment and wages were estimated in the leather and shoes 
industry, while the textile sector shows the smallest. The garment industry and 
services sectors fell in between the two. On the one hand, the leather and 
shoes industry is the most export-oriented sector, thus may have captured the 
full benefit of a payroll tax reduction designed to stimulate exports. On the 
other, the textile sector was only fully covered by the policy at a latter moment 
in time, which seems to explain the smaller effects in 2012.  
Empirical studies carried out in Latin-America and elsewhere tend to show 
small employment effects and partial shifting of payroll tax changes on to wag-
es (Gruber 1997, Cruces et al. 2010, Bennmarker et al. 2009). This study points 
in the opposite direction, suggesting a substantial employment effect. The rea-
sons might be that the analysis here is limited to a few sectors and does not 
attempt to evaluate the overall impact on the aggregate employment level. 
The employment effect is consistent with the theory that a decrease in la-
bour costs results in an expansion in the demand for labour at firm or sector 
levels. The shift in demand interacts with an elastic labour supply to the formal 
labour market, determined by the size of the informal economy and the high 
unemployment rate, resulting in the adjustment by the employment with small-
er effect on wages.  
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Results presented here contrast with two studies about the Brazilian pay-
roll tax reform that found small positive effects on employment, though not 
across all covered sectors (Dallava 2014, FGV Projetos 2013). It is believed 
that the empirical approach adopted in this paper, and the control for firm 
fixed effects, offers a better solution to the identification problem that comes 
from the evaluation of such policy, as seen by more intuitive results and highly 
significant estimates. 
Once data for 2013 and 2014 are available, a broader policy evaluation us-
ing this approach could include sectors that were covered in the second half of 
2012 onwards. It is also possible to undertake further evaluations using other 
data sources that contain information about relevant covariates such as capital 
intensity, and gross revenue. Moreover, the aggregate impact of the payroll tax 
reduction and its substitution by a revenue tax could be evaluated more broad-
ly by use of an adequate methodology and including fiscal and inter-sectorial 
interactions. 
The policy seems to have achieved the expected increase in formal em-
ployment and perhaps an enhanced competitiveness, at least for the covered 
industries and in its first year. However, given the limitations of this study, 
these conclusions do not imply that aggregate effects will be the same. Besides, 
reductions in other non-wage labour costs in Brazil may not have similar ef-
fects, as changes in each component of labour costs will trigger specific effects 
on the labour market. Instead of a simplistic generalization, it seems also nec-
essary to consider the implications of changes in social security, training, and 
the financing of other social programmes.  
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Appendix 1 
Hourly compensation costs in manufacturing, 
U.S. dollars, 2005-2012 
Country or Area 2005 2010 2011 2012 
Norway 42.04 57.66 64.76 63.36 
Switzerland 40.10 51.10 60.40 57.79 
Belgium 41.00 50.72 54.76 52.19 
Sweden 35.39 43.51 49.21 49.80 
Denmark 37.05 47.93 51.67 48.47 
Australia 28.55 39.68 46.47 47.68 
Germany 38.03 43.84 47.42 45.79 
Finland 33.72 41.44 45.05 42.60 
Austria 32.37 39.98 43.23 41.53 
France 32.66 39.12 42.12 39.81 
Netherlands 33.29 39.54 42.26 39.62 
Ireland 28.64 38.57 39.74 38.17 
Canada 26.26 34.36 36.34 36.59 
United States 30.14 34.81 35.51 35.67 
Japan 25.25 31.75 35.71 35.34 
Italy 27.71 33.57 36.15 34.18 
United Kingdom 29.72 29.11 30.77 31.23 
Spain 20.74 26.66 28.44 26.83 
New Zealand 16.26 20.42 23.38 24.77 
Singapore 13.25 19.42 23.13 24.16 
Korea, Republic of 14.83 17.89 19.25 20.72 
Israel 13.27 19.22 21.14 20.14 
Greece 15.25 22.36 22.68 19.41 
Argentina 5.51 12.77 15.98 18.87 
Portugal 9.54 11.94 13.15 12.10 
Czech Republic 7.30 11.42 12.71 11.95 
Slovakia 5.82 10.72 11.77 11.30 
Brazil 5.01 10.01 11.67 11.20 
Estonia 5.51 9.47 10.42 10.41 
Taiwan 7.93 8.37 9.34 9.46 
Hungary 6.71 8.39 9.17 8.95 
Poland 5.60 8.16 8.68 8.25 
Mexico 5.61 6.14 6.49 6.36 
Philippines 1.20 1.89 2.02 2.10 
Note: Compensation costs include direct pay, social insurance expenditures, and labor-related taxes. 
Except for Argentina, Japan, Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan, data relate to manufacturing as 
defined by the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) 
Revision 4. 'NA' means data not available.  
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, International Labor Comparisons, August 2013 
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Appendix 2 
Hourly social insurance expenditures and other 
labour-related taxes as a percent of  total hourly 
compensation costs in manufacturing, 2005-2012 
Country or Area 2005 2010 2011 2012 
Sweden 33.2 33.0 32.9 33.3 
Brazil 32.8 32.0 32.8 32.8 
Belgium 30.8 32.2 32.2 32.2 
Mexico 30.7 30.0 30.1 30.2 
France 31.1 29.9 29.9 29.9 
Italy 30.7 28.9 28.9 28.9 
Slovakia 27.2 27.5 27.1 27.1 
Czech Republic 26.6 27.0 26.6 26.6 
Estonia 25.6 26.4 26.0 26.1 
Spain 25.7 26.1 25.4 25.9 
Austria 25.2 25.7 25.7 25.7 
United States 22.4 24.6 24.4 23.9 
Hungary 27.9 23.8 23.5 23.5 
Greece 22.1 23.1 23.1 23.1 
Finland 21.6 22.3 22.3 22.3 
Netherlands 21.9 21.2 21.2 21.6 
Korea, Republic of 17.4 20.3 20.8 21.5 
Germany 22.4 21.9 21.6 21.2 
Canada 18.4 20.0 20.0 19.9 
Australia 21.3 20.0 19.8 19.7 
Portugal 20.1 19.7 19.7 19.7 
Japan 17.8 18.1 18.1 18.1 
Norway 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 
Ireland 14.5 16.6 15.8 17.5 
Argentina 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.4 
Israel 16.2 16.6 17.7 17.2 
Singapore 14.2 16.2 16.5 16.7 
United Kingdom 14.4 14.8 15.4 15.6 
Switzerland 15.5 15.3 15.3 15.3 
Taiwan 13.0 14.8 14.4 14.5 
Poland 15.4 12.6 12.6 12.6 
Denmark 10.5 9.6 9.6 9.6 
Philippines 8.8 8.5 8.5 8.5 
New Zealand 3.2 3.7 4.2 4.2 
Note: Employer social insurance expenditures are legally required, private, and contractual social 
benefit costs, and labor-related taxes minus subsidies. Except for Argentina, Japan, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Taiwan, data relate to manufacturing as defined by the International Standard 
Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) Revision 4. 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, International Labor Comparisons, August 2013 
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Appendix 3 
Brazilian Classification of  Occupations – CBO - 
Groups 
Groups  Titles 
0 Armed forces, policemen and military firefighters 
1 High level members of public entities, directors of public organizations, enterprises 
and managers 
2 Professionals of sciences and arts 
3 Intermediary level technicians 
4 Workers in administrative services 
5 Workers in services, salesmen in shops and markets 
6  Workers in agriculture, livestock farming, forests, hunting and fishing 
7 Workers in industrial goods and services 
8 Workers in industrial goods and services (continuous production processes) 
9  Workers in maintenance and reparation 
Source: Brazilian Ministry of Labour. 
http://www.mtecbo.gov.br/cbosite/pages/informacoesGerais.jsf#6. Translated by the author. 
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Appendix 4 
Fixed effects estimates – placebo regression of  
outcome variables on the tax regime – existing 
firms in 2010 and 2011 with less than 50 
employees in 2011 – selected sectors – Brazil 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Average employment 
Contracted working 
hours 
Average hourly wage 
(BR$) 
FE RE FE RE FE RE 
       
Time 1 -0.177*** -0.273*** 185.8*** 34.21 0.276*** 0.142*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0354) (51.71) (51.19) (0.0142) (0.0141) 
Treatment -0.435*** 0.177** -770.0*** 218.5* 0.174*** 0.755*** 
 (0.0820) (0.0768) (118.2) (111.9) (0.0324) (0.0307) 
Share of 
workers with 
intermediary 
schooling or + 
-0.660*** -1.890*** -939.2*** -3,149*** 0.294*** 1.735*** 
(0.161) (0.0944) (231.6) (143.5) (0.0634) (0.0381) 
Constant 11.26*** 11.94*** 17,131*** 18,352*** 4.760*** 3.964*** 
 (0.0916) (0.0690) (132.1) (105.9) (0.0362) (0.0279) 
       
Observations 142,444 142,444 142,444 142,444 142,444 142,444 
R-squared 0.002  0.001  0.009  
Number of 
firms 
71,222 71,222 71,222 71,222 71,222 71,222 
Note: dependent variables in levels. Treatment is a dummy variable for firms not under the 
Simples regime in 2012. Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix 5 
Parallel trends for firms with less than 50 
employees in 2011 and that existed in 2010, 2011 
and 2012 – selected sectors – Brazil 
 
Source: MTE-RAIS, 2010, 2011, 2012 
  
2010 2011 2012
Treatment 12.72 12.11 13.40
Control 10.90 11.37 11.12
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Appendix 6 
Estimates of  effects of  reduction in Social 
Security contribution on employment, hours of  
work and hourly wage using Fixed Effects – 
excluding textile sector – firms with less than 50 
employees in 2011 - Brazil – 2011/12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Average employment 
Contracted working 
hours 
Average hourly wage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Time 0.321*** 0.355*** 803.3*** 839.8*** 0.377*** 0.382*** 
 (0.0452) (0.0456) (58.91) (59.40) (0.0137) (0.0138) 
Treatment 1.608*** 1.752*** 1,593*** 1,748*** 0.169*** 0.189*** 
 (0.0954) (0.0986) (124.4) (128.5) (0.0289) (0.0299) 
Switch of tax 
regime 
 -0.914***  -978.3***  -0.130*** 
 (0.158)  (206.1)  (0.0480) 
Workers with 
intermediary 
schooling or + 
-1.067*** -1.066*** -1,215*** -1,213*** 0.313*** 0.313*** 
(0.204) (0.204) (265.8) (265.8) (0.0619) (0.0619) 
Constant 11.01*** 11.00*** 16,581*** 16,580*** 5.287*** 5.286*** 
 (0.123) (0.123) (160.8) (160.7) (0.0374) (0.0374) 
       
Observations 134,488 134,488 134,488 134,488 134,488 134,488 
R-squared 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.019 0.019 
Number of 
firms 
67,244 67,244 67,244 67,244 67,244 67,244 
Note: dependent variables in levels. Treatment is a dummy variable for firms not 
under the Simples regime in 2012. Switch of tax regime is a dummy = 1 if a firm shifted the 
tax regime from 2011 to 2012. Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Appendix 7 
Estimates of  effects of  reduction in Social 
Security contribution on employment, hours of  
work and hourly wage using Fixed Effects – 
selected sectors – firms with less than 50 
employees in 2011 - Brazil – 2010/12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Average employment 
Contracted working 
hours 
Average hourly wage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Time 1 -0.0669 -0.0517 320.1*** 338.7*** 0.425*** 0.421*** 
 (0.0411) (0.0412) (55.83) (55.91) (0.0124) (0.0124) 
Time 2 0.331*** 0.391*** 1,250*** 1,317*** 0.793*** 0.787*** 
 (0.0447) (0.0454) (60.66) (61.60) (0.0135) (0.0137) 
Treatment 1.073*** 1.166*** 671.5*** 761.6*** 0.244*** 0.257*** 
 (0.0801) (0.0821) (108.8) (111.4) (0.0242) (0.0247) 
Switch of tax 
regime 
 -0.694***  -686.9***  -0.0792** 
 (0.127)  (172.3)  (0.0383) 
Workers with 
intermediary 
schooling or + 
 -0.680***  -876.5***  0.277*** 
 (0.129)  (175.2)  (0.0389) 
Constant 10.67*** 11.04*** 16,071*** 16,560*** 4.974*** 4.818*** 
 (0.0304) (0.0782) (41.21) (106.2) (0.00915) (0.0236) 
       
Observations 212,028 212,028 212,028 212,028 212,028 212,028 
R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.035 0.035 
Number of 
firms 
75,981 75,981 75,981 75,981 75,981 75,981 
Note: dependent variables in levels. Treatment is a dummy variable for firms not 
under the Simples regime in 2012. Switch of tax regime is a dummy = 1 if a firm shifted the 
tax regime from 2011 to 2012. Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Appendix 8 
Estimates of  effects of  reduction in Social 
Security contribution on employment, hours of  
work and hourly wage using Fixed Effects by 
economic sector – firms with less than 50 
employees in 2011 - Brazil – 2011/12 
 Dependent variable Average employment in levels 
VARIABLES Garment 
Leather and 
Shoes 
Textile Services 
     
Time 0.132*** 0.524*** 0.249* 1.082*** 
 (0.0484) (0.168) (0.137) (0.111) 
Treatment 1.351*** 4.707*** 1.227*** 0.816*** 
 (0.127) (0.393) (0.290) (0.171) 
Switch of tax regime -1.042*** -2.327*** -0.0892 0.0735 
 (0.183) (0.611) (0.493) (0.309) 
Workers with intermedi-
ary schooling or + 
-0.456** -4.809*** -0.120 0.570 
(0.210) (0.722) (0.570) (0.597) 
Constant 10.87*** 14.25*** 10.95*** 8.018*** 
 (0.114) (0.311) (0.296) (0.533) 
     
Observations 84,700 18,668 14,984 31,120 
R-squared 0.004 0.026 0.005 0.020 
Number of firms 42,350 9,334 7,492 15,560 
Note: dependent variables in levels. Treatment is a dummy variable for firms not under the Simples 
regime in 2012. Switch of tax regime is a dummy = 1 if a firm shifted the tax regime from 2011 to 2012. 
Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix 8 – continuation 
 Dependent variable: Contracted working hours 
VARIABLES Garment 
Leather and 
Shoes 
Textile Services 
Time 538.3*** 1,091*** 541.7*** 1,785*** 
 (65.40) (224.3) (157.4) (129.2) 
Treatment 949.4*** 5,067*** 656.6** 935.5*** 
 (171.3) (523.6) (333.5) (200.1) 
Switch of tax regime -973.3*** -2,975*** 309.9 316.9 
 (246.4) (814.1) (567.7) (360.4) 
Workers with intermedi-
ary schooling or + 
-594.1** -5,243*** -84.15 1,008 
(284.1) (962.5) (656.2) (696.8) 
Constant 16,845*** 20,391*** 17,192*** 11,708*** 
 (153.4) (415.2) (340.8) (621.9) 
Observations 84,700 18,668 14,984 31,120 
R-squared 0.003 0.021 0.004 0.033 
Number of firms 42,350 9,334 7,492 15,560 
Note: dependent variables in levels. Treatment is a dummy variable for firms not under the Simples 
regime in 2012. Switch of tax regime is a dummy = 1 if a firm shifted the tax regime from 2011 to 2012. 
Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix 8 – continuation 
 Dependent variable: Average hourly wage 
VARIABLES Garment 
Leather and 
Shoes 
Textile Services 
Time 0.355*** 0.382*** 0.382*** 0.485*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0164) (0.0269) (0.0541) 
Treatment 0.0354 0.131*** 0.133** 0.277*** 
 (0.0327) (0.0383) (0.0569) (0.0838) 
Switch of tax regime -0.114** -0.156*** 0.0139 -0.00179 
 (0.0471) (0.0596) (0.0969) (0.151) 
Workers with intermediary 
schooling or + 
0.0937* 0.438*** 0.470*** 1.591*** 
(0.0543) (0.0705) (0.112) (0.292) 
Constant 4.393*** 4.374*** 4.740*** 7.412*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0304) (0.0581) (0.260) 
Observations 84,700 18,668 14,984 31,120 
R-squared 0.023 0.081 0.045 0.016 
Number of firms 42,350 9,334 7,492 15,560 
Note: dependent variables in levels. Treatment is a dummy variable for firms not under the Simples 
regime in 2012. Switch of tax regime is a dummy = 1 if a firm shifted the tax regime from 2011 to 2012. 
Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix 9  
Descriptive statistics - Selected sectors – Brazil 
– 2011 - % 
 
VARIABLES 
CONTROL  TREATMENT 
Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 
      
Average number of jobs 17.00 31.36 
 
108.75 1,613.39 
Employment in production 0.77 0.31 
 
0.68 0.33 
Average hours of work per firm 25,525 45,935 
 
154,496 1,902,618 
Average hourly wage (BR$) 4.74 2.67 
 
7.93 9.57 
      
Sex (male =1) 0.34 0.33 
 
0.48 0.33 
Average age 33.25 7.53  33.18 7.37 
Share of employees w/ medium level 
of schooling  
0.55 0.37 
 
0.65 0.36 
Share of employees age< 25  0.27 0.26 
 
0.25 0.25 
Share of adult male employees 0.22 0.27 
 
0.34 0.30 
REGION      
North 0.01 0.10 
 
0.01 0.10 
Northeast 0.14 0.34 
 
0.10 0.30 
Southeast 0.47 0.50 
 
0.62 0.48 
South 0.31 0.46 
 
0.22 0.41 
Centre-west 0.07 0.26 
 
0.05 0.21 
SECTOR      
Textile 0.10 0.30 
 
0.13 0.33 
Garment 0.61 0.49 
 
0.39 0.49 
Leather and shoes 0.14 0.35 
 
0.13 0.34 
Service sectors 0.15 0.36 
 
0.36 0.48 
      
FIRMS 62,709 
  
21,096 
 
JOBS 1,066,287 
  
2,294,230 
 
Source: MTE/RAIS 2011 
